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Ceci est un document de travail semi-structuré répertoriant les sources potentiellement utiles sur le sujet du Mouvement Azov, il n'a pas vocation à devenir un article tel quel mais peut être utile pour développer du contenu.

Un document de travail annexe sans structure avec davantage de citations (mais certaines sources n'y sont pas) existe aussi[1].

Qu'est-ce que le mouvement Azov?

Histoire du mouvement et du régiment Azov

« The Azov movement has its roots in a little known and initially Russian-speaking Kharkiv groupuscule called "Patriot of Ukraine." This initially minuscule circle emerged from the SNPU's group, Andriy Bilets'kyy (b. 1979), as well as some other members of the "Patriot of Ukraine" were imprisoned in 2011-2012 for various reasons, including alleged robbery, beatings, terrorism, and assaults. Partly, these accusations were overdrawn and referred to political rather than criminal episodes. The locked-up ultra-nationalists were released after the toppling of Viktor Yanukovych in early 2014. In spring 2014 in eastern Ukraine, Bilets'kyy and his followers organized small paramilitary units called "little black men" -- an obvious reference to the nickname, "little green men," given to Russian regular army forces who wore no identification marks while occupying Crimea in late February and early March 2014. As the confrontation with pro-Russian groups in the Donets' Basin (Donbas) and Kharkiv g, Bilets'kyy's once minor grouping grew rapidly. In May 2014, it formed the semi-regular volunteer battalion "Azov" under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. In summer 2014, the Azov battalion played a central role in the liberation of the important Donbas industrial city of Mariupol from Russia-led separatists. By autumn 2014, the battalion had become a well-known professional military unit and was transformed into the fully regular "Azov" Regiment of the National Guard under the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine. It has since been considered one of Ukraine's most capable armed formations. The regiment's commanders claim it is now operating according to NATO standards. »

« Quand la guerre éclate dans le Donbass en avril 2014, l’armée ukrainienne est désorganisée et le gouvernement craint de perdre le contrôle de ce territoire au profit de la Russie, comme ce fut le cas le mois précédent en Crimée. Pour contrer les séparatistes prorusses, le gouvernement autorise des bataillons de volontaires indépendants de l’armée à combattre. Plusieurs formations armées d’extrême droite apparaissent. Parmi elles, on trouve le « Corps noir », qui prendra rapidement le nom de « bataillon Azov » en référence à la mer qui borde la Crimée et le sud-est de l’Ukraine. Il s’agit d’une unité d’une centaine de volontaires aux idées nationalistes et néonazies, dont certains sont « issus du hooliganisme et du paramilitaire », explique Adrien Nonjon, chercheur à l’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (Inalco), spécialiste de l’extrême droite et du nationalisme ukrainien. »

« While many commentators emphasise the right-wing extremist party-political background of the Azov Battalion85, MP and Azov affiliate Oleh Petrenko, once a football fan club activist from Cherkassy and short-term Right Sector member, has claimed that 50% of the early Azov fighters came out of the ultras movement from all over Ukraine86. The related Tsyvil’nyi korpus “Azov” (Azov Civil Corps) comprised Azov veterans and other nationalist activists, raised financial and material support for the frontlines, recruited fighters for the Azov regiment, provided, in its own words, “truthful and timely” information about developments in the Donbas, and “created a patriotic environment” via “unification of supporters around the national idea”87. Azov commander Andrii Bilets’kyi has described this structure, “one of the most extended networks of activists in Ukraine”, as the backbone of the National Corps party »

« In winter 2015, veterans and volunteers of the regiment created the Azov Civil Corps and thereby started to expand their political grouping into a multi-faceted social movement. In 2016, Bilets'kyy formed the political party National Corps, drawing membership from the Azov Civil Corps and veterans of the Azov Battalion and Regiment. In January 2018, an offshoot of the Azov movement, the unarmed vigilante organization National Squads, became a Ukrainian media sensation after it held a visually impressive public torch march. Further sub-organizations and branches of the Azov movement have emerged since 2014. They include entities such as the Engineering Corps, Cossack House, Plomin (Flame) Literary Club, Orden (Order) circle, Youth Corps, Intermarium Support Group, and others. While being partly independent, the fronts and subunits of the Azov movement share basic stances on certain political issues, closely cooperate with each other, and accept Bilets'kyy as the unofficial leader of the entire coalition. As a result, Azov is now a multi-dimensional socio-political movement that is developing in a variety of directions. [...] Despite officially allying itself with Svobody and others since 2016, the Azov movement remains an ideologically and institutionally specific phenomenon within Ukraine's ultra-nationalist political spectrum and contains branches that profess views untypical to the traditional Ukrainian far right. For example, some Azov members espouse not a Christian-Orthtodox outlook, but an interest in paganism. »

« Minister of Interior Avavkov later commented on the establishment of Azov as a fully regular armed unit, under his ministry, and its inclusion of ultra-nationalists, the following way: "Many political leaders were afraid of the whole volunteer movement. It is very complicated, for me too. There are issues [with that]. In Azov, there are more of them than in other [volunteer units]. This concerns the religious views [i.e. paganism] of various people, and the right-wing radicals. But would it be better, if the right-wing radicals were on the streets and destroying vitrines [of shops]? Or [isn’t it better that they] feel responsibility for this country and fight a little bit for it? This is my logic." »

« The emergence of the Azov regiment and political rise of its leader was thus—at least, initially—not an expression of exploding right-wing extremism, but a component of a larger wave of armed and non-armed societal activism generated by the specifically post-revolutionary Ukrainian circumstances after the Euromaydan, and by the peculiarly hybrid (i.e., combined military and non-military) war that Russia has been semi-secretly conducting ever since against Ukraine. »

« Although Azov itself has become fully integrated into the National Guard and thereby a combat unit of the Ministry of Interior, its creators have recently started a new comprehensive party-political project and non-governmental movement that goes beyond the confines of national security, patriotic mobilization, and military defense. With the creation of the Azov-linked political party Natsional’nyy korpus (National Corps), non-governmental organization Tsyvil’nyy korpus (Civil Corps), and unarmed militias Natsional’nyy druzhyny (National Fellowships) in 2015–2017, the Azov founders may be returning to their roots in the Patriot of Ukraine and Social-National Assembly. Perhaps, these new initiatives are ideologically sufficiently dissimilar from the SNA/PU to be also classified as permutations of neo-Nazism; perhaps, not. Future research will have to show. »

« On October 14, 2016, the Azov Civic Corps, during a meeting, adopted the decision to start a new explicitly political project, the National Corps. Rather than legally creating a new party, two already-existing organisations, the Hromadians’kyi rukh “Chesni Spravy” (Civic Movement “Fair Action”) and “Patriot Ukrainy” (“Patriot of Ukraine”), founded in 2005, were merged and renamed »

« An entire movement has developed around the Azov Battalion in recent years. The goal is to establish a global coalition of right-wing extremist groups, Semenyaka said in a 2019 interview with Time magazine.24 »

« Yet from the perspective of Ukraine's fledgling democracy, the most dangerous such phenomenon may not be S14, Svoboda or the now thoroughly marginalized Right Sector, but instead the multi-faceted Azov movement, with its regular National Guard regiment and its links to the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the all-Ukrainian party National Corps, and the unarmed vigilante wing National Fellowship. While it would be going too far to classify the Azov Regiment as a terrorist organization, its various political and "uncivil" spin-off associations arguably represent the largest long-term domestic right-wing extremist threat to Ukraine's democracy. Unlike previous Ukrainian far-right projects, the Azov movement has managed to create a multi-dimensional and distinctly modern (and even post-modern) identity that has particular appeal to the young and is not regionally limited. It cooperates closely with like-minded groups abroad, including certain Russian neo-Nazi groups. [...] Azov is a dynamic uncivil movement that is actively advancing on different domestic fronts and strengthening its foreign contacts. It has become a visible part of the international groupuscular right, and maintains links to uncivil (mainly racist) organizations in the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, among others. »

« Azov is a dynamic uncivil movement that is actively advancing on different domestic fronts and strengthening its foreign contacts. It has become a visible part of the international groupuscular right, and maintains links to uncivil (mainly racist) organizations in the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, among others. »

« Yet, Azov’s transformation into a larger venture combining an armed regiment with a political party and supposedly non-political self-help movement raises concerns. It may mean that the Azov phenomenon will eventually have to be re-evaluated within the framework of uncivil movement as well as right-wing extremism studies, and the peculiar threats that groups falling under these headings pose for the consolidation and development of democracy. »

« If you needed to briefly explain Azov to someone who doesn’t know the situation in Ukraine, how would you describe it and what historical comparisons would you draw on?

Fortunately, comparisons with the far-right movements of the 1930s and 40s are not really appropriate because Azov is not as powerful or numerous as Hitler’s Stormers or Mussolini’s Blackshirts. I’d resort to a comparison which the far-right use themselves: the German Freikorps in the interwar period. One far-right organization chose this name on purpose in Ukraine today. The historical similarities are not entirely accurate, so I would mention contemporary Italian fascists from CasaPound, especially given that the Ukrainian far right have been in contact with them and Azov was partially modeled after the Italian example.

A much better comparison is the far-right movements in Croatia and Serbia. In Croatia, the far right were a part of the effort to defend the country against a more aggressive dominant force. If we look at Croatia, we will find that the veterans of the War of Independence still constitute a force 30 years later. This is a great example of how war and far-right nationalism turn into an ugly cocktail which self-reproduces decades after the war. There was never any war action in the Serbian lands, but the far-right nationalism in Serbia became mainstream after the war in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. This is what concerns me the most in the Ukrainian context: the war will end, but the effects of the far right becoming a part of the mainstream will last for decades. »

« From Centuria, the black-clad paramilitary that’s been part of the movement’s civil defence training sessions, to youth camps, book clubs and sports classes, the Azov movement tries to be a one-stop shop for all things far right."

"The Azov movement has used the current crisis to try and make itself appear more mainstream, hosting public civil defence training sessions and positioning itself as the force that can best protect Ukraine from its enemies, particularly in the case of a full-scale invasion. »

« Ukrainian police had long treated his organization, Patriot of Ukraine, as a neo-Nazi terrorist group. Biletsky’s nickname within the group was Bely Vozhd, or White Ruler, and his manifesto seemed to pluck its narrative straight from Nazi ideology. Ukrainian nationalists, it said, must “lead the white nations of the world in a final crusade for their survival, a crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen,” a German term for “subhumans” with roots in Nazi propaganda.

Within days of his release, Biletsky set out to assemble a far-right militia. “That was our rise to the surface after a long period underground,” Biletsky told TIME in an interview that winter in Ukraine. The insignia he chose for the militia combined two symbols—the “black sun” and the “wolf’s hook”—both of which were used by the German Nazis during World War II.

Azov Regiment veterans, whose banners carry an emblem derived from a Nazi symbol, the Wolfsangel, march in Kyiv in 2019. »

« Près de quatre ans après la Révolution de la dignité, il convient de noter que l’environnement politique et médiatique reste pluraliste. Lénine n’a pas été remplacé partout par Stepan Bandera. Mais la « bandérisation partielle » relevée par Andreas Umland s’impose dans de nombreuses situations. Elle légitime aussi l’utilisation de l’outil historiographique par certains mouvements nationalistes, acteurs incontournables, bien que minoritaires, de la scène politique ukrainienne. Le très controversé bataillon Azov, dont certains membres sont ouvertement néonazis, a ainsi recours à des symboles historiques pour établir sa légitimité dans le jeu politique. Son jeune parti, Natsionalniy Korpus (« Corpus National »), et sa milice citoyenne, les Natsionalniy Druzhyny (« Brigades nationales ») s’inscrivent dans la tradition des combattants pour l’indépendance, et revendiquent un héritage nationaliste allant du royaume médiéval de la Rous’ de Kiev à l’UPA. « Un peuple sans histoire n’a pas de raison de se battre », assène ainsi le chef d’Azov, Andrij Bilezkyj. La redécouverte et l’instrumentalisation de thématiques historiques semblent justifier, dans les propos d’Azov, l’érection d’un ordre nouveau et une militarisation permanente de la société. De manière directe ou indirecte, un tel projet trouve un terreau fertile dans les troubles des dernières années et dans les polémiques liées au virage historiographique entretenu par l’IMN. »

« Azov's predecessor Patriot of Ukraine took part in this very activity in Kharkiv for allies of Arsen Avakov in the 2000s. »

« In 2016, Biletsky partially returned to the Azov Battalion to found a far-right ultra-nationalist political wing called the National Corps. As part of this political wing’s creation, he toned down some of his political rhetoric and white supremacist views.[40] Olena Semenyaka became actively involved in the National Corps’ leadership.[41]

In 2017, Azov created an umbrella organization with other far-right groups to boost the National Corp’s presence in elections.[42] Described as a nationalist hate group by the U.S. government, National Corps barely registered in the national polls in 2019 And failed to meet the 5% threshold to obtain Parliamentary seats.[43] In 2018, the National Corps was estimated to have less than 20,000 members, and ran on a platform of re-establishing Ukraine as a nuclear power, and opposing European institutions.[44] The National Corps also supports Azov’s international recruitment, providing housing and logistical support to arriving foreign volunteers.[45] It is difficult to know exactly how many foreign fighters have joined the Azov Battalion. A report by the Counter Extremism Project estimates that foreign fighters with ties to right wing extremism number in the hundreds, and cites the Azov Battalion as the key organization at the center of this recruitment.[46]

In 2017, the organization created a new street wing faction known as the National Druzhyna or National Militia.[47] The National Militia patrolled neighborhoods in small groups to ostensibly promote law and order. It also harassed public officials and clashed with police in January 2018.[48] The National Militia conducted attacks against Roma and other minority targets.[49]

In February 2018, the National Militia formally announced its existence during a public assembly and torchlit march of 600 followers in Kiev. During the march, members swore allegiance to Andriy Biletsky and the Azov Battalion.[50]

In 2019, Ukraine’s Central Election Commission granted the National Militia permission to officially monitor the presidential election. Although the commission specified the group was not permitted to use force, members openly stated they were willing to take matters into their own hands to stop election fraud.[51] Members of the Azov Battalion, the National Corps, and the National Militia appear to flow between the three branches.[52] Since the creation of all three groups - the Azov Battalion, the National Corps, and the National Militia - collectively they are often referred to as the “Azov Movement”. [...] In February 2022, the group came to prominence again during the Russian military build-up on the border with Ukraine. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation… to demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine”, the Azov Battalion was thought to be one of the organizations he referred to.[53] In response to the Russian invasion though, far right militia leaders across Europe are posting declarations to join the fight against Russia.[54] Members of the Azov Battalion see the invasion as an opportunity to raise their profile, and gain increased political influence.[55] Olena Semenyaka, spokeswoman for Azov, referenced Azov’s role in Ukraine as an opportunity to play a bigger role in Ukraine’s future politics.[56] »

À relier avec Collaboration en Ukraine durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale:

« En l’espèce, s’il semble difficile d’estimer la proportion réelle de néonazis en Ukraine – indéniablement minoritaires –, la question qui mérite d’être posée ab initio concerne les raisons de ces réminiscences. En effet, il convient de distinguer deux périodes et deux situations historiques distinctes. D’une part, la région occidentale de l’actuelle Ukraine, la Galicie, anciennement austro-hongroise, puis polonaise (1918-1939), est historiquement le foyer de développement du nationalisme ukrainien. Pour les partisans de ces mouvements, la collaboration de circonstance avec le IIIe Reich reposait sur l’espoir – déçu – d’obtenir l’indépendance de la nation ukrainienne. D’autre part, la répression soviétique à l’encontre de la paysannerie ukrainienne opposée à la collectivisation des terres eut pour conséquence la terrible famine des années 1932-1933 (holodomor) responsable de la mort d’environ 3,5 millions de personnes ; le chiffre est discuté mais l’unité de grandeur demeure le million de mort. Ce qui est incontestablement une tragédie nationale est cependant l’objet d’une instrumentalisation de l’histoire par les nationalistes ukrainiens (exagération des chiffres, photographies falsifiées, etc.) qui voient ainsi dans la reconnaissance d’un génocide ukrainien le moyen de couper les ponts avec la Russie. Notons d’ailleurs ce procès symbolique intenté aux « responsables de la famine – Staline, Molotov, Kaganovitch, et d’autres – sous l’égide des services de sécurité ukrainiens (SBU), et dont le verdict fut opportunément publié le 13 janvier 2010, à quelques jours seulement de l’élection présidentielle[5]. »^{[à développer]} »

Liens avec les mouvements radicaux et néonazis russes

Le mouvement Azov inclut depuis ses débuts des gens des milieux d'extrême-droite ou nazis de Russie, certains ont joués des rôles cruciaux dans la fondation du bataillon Azov, et il y a encore des liens assez opaques avec les groupes russes et les oligarques russes, la langue principalement parlée dans le mouvement Azov étant même le russe:

« [traduction automatique] Le bataillon Azov (aujourd'hui le régiment Azov de la Garde nationale d'Ukraine) a été créé en 2014 sur la base de volontaires, membres de l'Assemblée nationale sociale d'extrême droite. Au fil du temps, le nombre d'Azov a augmenté, tout comme son rôle et sa position. En 2015, le Corps civique d'Azov a été créé sur la base d'Azov, et en 2016, un parti politique à part entière du Corps national a été créé. Le mouvement Azov est au centre du mouvement d'extrême droite en Ukraine, disent les experts.

Grâce au Maïdan, des structures patriotiques ukrainiennes stables ont émergé, majoritairement russophones. Et le plus brillant d'entre eux est le "mouvement Azov", créé par des gens de Kharkiv, c'est-à-dire des gens d'origine russophone. Et les nazis, venus de Russie, y jouent un rôle très important: à la fois idéologique - dans le cas d'Alexei Levkin de WotanJugend et en partie du Boatswain, et économique - dans ce cas la figure du Boatswain en tant que principal capitaliste de le mouvement Azov prend le devant de la scène. Ici, il joue le même rôle qu'il a joué dans la RNU biélorusse (Unité nationale russe) et la NSO russe (Société nationale socialiste). Je dirais que le personnage central est Serhiy Korotkykh , et tous les autres sont d'importance secondaire », a déclaré Leonid Ragozin. »

« [traduction automatique] Pour l'extrême droite, le conflit est en grande partie le sens de l'existence. Ce sont des gens qui sont simplement intéressés par le conflit, donc ils ne se soucient généralement pas de quel côté combattre - Ukrainien ou Russe. Parce que les nazis russes se considéraient comme opposés au régime de Poutine, beaucoup ont choisi l'Ukraine. Ils qualifient le régime de Poutine d'ennemi et visent à libérer la Russie d'un régime qui n'est tout simplement pas considéré comme russe », a déclaré Leonid Ragozin.

Après le début de la guerre en 2014 et la formation du bataillon Azov, les étrangers d'extrême droite, notamment russes, ont réalisé que le rôle de l'extrême droite en Ukraine et leur position dans la société avaient changé : ils ont cessé d'être critiqués et contrôlés. par la société. . Ainsi, un environnement ouvert a été créé en Ukraine pour l'extrême droite du monde entier, et les nazis de diverses organisations se sont précipités pour en profiter . Au début - des volontaires au front, puis dans le "Azov" pour acquérir de l'expérience dans la construction d'un réseau organisationnel. »

« Colborne describes the nascent battalion as “a significant number of individuals from Ukraine’s far-right football hooligan scene, estimated from 50 percent to 65 percent of Azov’s fighters at the time. Other fighters included open neo-Nazis from foreign countries, especially Russia.” »

« The Azov Battalion/Regiment has been particularly active in recruiting foreigners to fight in eastern Ukraine. Among all the foreign fighters present in the Donbas, there may have been as many as 3,000 Russian citizens who fought in the Russian-Ukrainian war on the side of the Ukrainian state. Some of them served and are still serving with the Azov Regiment. As detailed below, a number of these former or current Russian citizens are also actively involved in the development of the Azov movement's civil and political structures. »

En fait la scène d'extrême-droite européenne est divisée entre le camp pro-ukrainien et le camp pro-russe d'après une enquête de Vice:

« Mais tous les partisans de l’extrême droite ne combattaient pas aux côtés du Régiment Azov sur les champs de bataille. Loin de là. La guerre en Ukraine a véritablement divisé les fidèles de l’extrême droite : certains soutenaient le camp ukrainien au prétexte que ce sont des nationalistes qui luttaient contre l’agression russe, alors que d’autres se sont rangés du côté russe, motivés en partie par le fait que le président russe Vladimir Poutine est un fervent défenseur d’une Europe traditionaliste et blanche.

« Les partisans de la droite en Europe… sont divisés en deux camps. Il y a les pro-Russes et les pro-Ukrainiens, » explique Skillt. « Mais c’est le camp pro-Russe qui est prédominant. »

Ironie de la situation, le Kremlin a essayé d’utiliser l’idéologie extrémiste du Régiment Azov pour salir la réputation de l’ensemble des forces ukrainiennes, mais des combattants étrangers suprémacistes blancs ont aussi été entraînés et enrôlés au sein de bataillons séparatistes pro-Russes comme le Mouvement Impérial Russe (RIM), une organisation ultra-nationaliste qui déclare combattre pour « la prédominance de la race blanche ».

Des experts déclarent que le RIM a permis d’acheminer des partisans de l’extrême droite pour les faire combattre aux côtés des Russes à travers leur branche militaire, la Légion impériale. L’an dernier, le gouvernement américain a ajouté le RIM à sa liste de groupes spécialement référencés comme terroristes au niveau mondial, déclarant que celui-ci avait « fourni un entraînement de type paramilitaire à des suprémacistes blancs et à des néo-nazis en Europe. » Par ailleurs, un média allemand citait des sources des services de renseignements, déclarant que des extrémistes allemands avaient été formés à l’utilisation d’armes à feu et d’explosifs dans un camp du RIM près de Saint-Pétersbourg.

Le mois dernier, les autorités tchèques ont rendu une visite surprise à un groupe paramilitaire suspecté d’avoir envoyé des citoyens tchèques en Ukraine pour combattre dans le camp des séparatistes pro-Russes. »

« Plus -- Ritzmann says -- there are far-right actors prominent in Russia, too. "There is a far-right extremist problem on both sides in the conflict, but there seems to be a bias in only reporting on Ukraine's far-right problem," he said. »

« For its part, Russia also has a thriving ultra-nationalist scene that is tolerated by the authorities. The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an extreme-right militia based in St. Petersburg, ​was, in 2020, the first White supremacist group to be categorized as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" by the US State Department. While the RIM has worked in opposition to Putin's regime, it has supported the Russian side in the war against Ukraine -- training Russian militants to join pro-Russian separatists in the conflict, according to the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. "They have never confronted their own nationalists," said Rekawek. ​Experts say Russia has also been a player in Europe's far-right space, with France's Marine Le Pen and Italy's Matteo Salvini enjoying close links with Putin before the 2022 invasion. And of the "few hundred western individuals with extreme right-wing or 'nationalist' convictions" who traveled to fight in the Ukraine conflict around 2014, "most of those extremist volunteers fought on the side of the pro-Russian separatists," according to a CEP report published in March. Ritzmann has found pro-Russian groups calling for volunteers in his research. This includes "the Russian security contractor Wagner Group, which has a history of displaying Nazi insignia," he said in the CEP report. But amid the tide of millions of refugees and untold damage to Ukrainian cities, some experts say Russia's fixation on a minor player like the Azov movement serves a purpose -- allowing the Kremlin to frame the conflict as an ideological and even existential struggle. However remote from reality that may be. »

« Q: Russia also has its share of neo-Nazis but several prominent figures such as Denis Nikitin or Alexey Levkin live in Ukraine. Why is that?

A: A lot of people don’t realise how many Russian neo-Nazis are not just in Ukraine, but on Ukraine’s side. Around 50 or more Russians served in the Azov Regiment. Many far-right Russians had already left for Ukraine before Maidan because, after initially trying to use the far right, Putin cracked down on them as he saw them as a potential source of opposition to his regime. When war broke out in Ukraine in 2014, they saw an opportunity to fight not against their mother country, but the Kremlin. Of course, they jumped at it. »

Doit-on différencier le mouvement Azov du régiment Azov?

« The basics: Ukraine’s far right, particularly the Azov movement, has long been able to operate with a degree of impunity and openness that makes it the envy of its international peers. The movement grew out of the Azov Regiment (originally a Battalion), formed in the chaos of war in early 2014 by a ragtag group of far-right thugs, football hooligans and international hangers-on — including dozens of Russian citizens — becoming an official unit of Ukraine’s National Guard.

[...]

What even makes up the Azov movement can depend on who you ask. In 2019 the movement’s former international spokesperson publicly described the Azov Regiment as the “military wing” of the Azov movement. These days the regiment and its defenders act like it’s a totally unrelated entity, but one that still openly recruits at movement events; witness the Azov movement leader Andriy Biletsky, the regiment’s first commander, at its cultlike yearly honouring of its fallen.

The movement’s most public face is the National Corps political party, which won barely 2 per cent of the vote in a coalition with other far-right parties in parliamentary elections in 2019. It’s more a brand than a party, a polished PR-focused outfit that isn’t above coyly referencing the so-called “14 words”, a white supremacist slogan. From Centuria, the black-clad paramilitary that’s been part of the movement’s civil defence training sessions, to youth camps, book clubs and sports classes, the Azov movement tries to be a one-stop shop for all things far right. There’s also a bevy of loosely affiliated but more extreme subgroups under its umbrella as well, including open neo-Nazis who praise and promote violence.  »

« E: There is currently much media visibility of the Azov Battalion but also a great amount of misunderstanding of the group and its involvement with the far-right in Ukraine. How would you characterize the role of the Azov movement? M: I’ve said before that the Azov movement, or just that shorthand ‘Azov,’ is one of the most widely discussed yet poorly understood far-right movements in the world. I’d describe the movement like this: it’s a multi-pronged, heterogeneous far-right social movement that grew out of its namesake military unit, the Azov Regiment, and exert at least some influence on Ukrainian politics and society despite its small numbers (e.g., at most 20,000 members estimated at some points in the past). It continues, even during the current invasion, to evolve and grow and adapt, and is probably one of the most PR-savvy far-right movements I’ve ever seen. But it’s not some invincible far-right force — it’s had its struggles, its ups and downs, and isn’t about to take over Ukraine in some flight of Russian propaganda fancy or become some mass Fascist movement of hundreds of thousands like the 1930s. Discourse on Azov tends to be black-and-white — it’s either nothing to be concerned about and uninfluential, or it’s literally the NSDAP redux — but there’s all sorts of shades of grey in there that get painted over. And studying it helps us, I’d argue, understand other far-right movements around the world. »

« The Azov Regiment within Ukraine’s National Guard has in recent years sought to distance itself from the broader Azov movement’s roots on the far right of the Ukrainian political spectrum. This has been used as an argument against calls from some quarters in the US to define the regiment as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. However, despite claims to have moved away from far-right ideology, the available evidence indicates that the regiment remains joined at the hip to the internationally active National Corps party it spawned, and the wider Azov movement associated with the regiment. "The Azov movement has long been a symbol of the far-right in Ukraine. It has risen to prominence over the past six years due to its role in the ongoing war against Russia, and has achieved levels of mainstream media exposure far in excess of the group’s minimal electoral support. This is not only a domestic issue for Ukraine. The far-right in general, and their apparent impunity, have significantly damaged Ukraine’s international reputation and left the country vulnerable to hostile narratives exaggerating the role of extremist groups in Ukraine. With awareness of right-wing terrorism now growing globally, the potential threat posed by the Ukrainian far-right beyond the borders of the country is attracting increasing attention. Shekhovtsov argues that the National Corps should be taken out of the debate about the Azov Regiment because “Azov attempted to depoliticize itself; the toxic far-right leadership formally left the regiment”. However, the role of the far-right leadership in the regiment remains evident. Both the National Guard unit and the political party admit to being part of the wider “Azov movement” led by the regiment’s first commander and current National Corps party leader Andriy Biletsky. The unit routinely hosts Biletsky (and other former commanders) at its bases and welcomes his participation in ceremonies, greeting him as a leader. Biletsky positions himself as the curator of the regiment, and has claimed to deal directly with Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov on related matters – a claim that Avakov appeared to confirm in early 2019. Shekhovtsov describes the regiment as a regular unit of the National Guard, but it is not. Regimental commanders have said that their unit owes its special status to being shielded from government interference. In 2019, the head of Azov’s military academy claimed Biletsky protected Azov from being “destroyed” by Ukraine’s leaders, while another commander described Biletsky as someone who “finds sponsors that really invest money”. Furthermore, Azov’s Kyiv recruitment center and military academy share a location with the offices of the National Corps." The relationship between the regiment and the National Corps is also blurred in the political messaging of Biletsky, who has posed with active duty Azov soldiers in political videos. National Corps figures routinely visit the regiment, and the party’s ideologists lecture Azov troops. Their blogs are published on the regiment’s site, while Azov’s social media pages promote the National Corps. According to an August 2017 video, ostensibly recorded at Azov’s base, emigre Russian neo-Nazi Alexey Levkin lectured the regiment. The close alignment between the Azov Regiment and the National Corps continues under the Zelenskyy presidency. In March 2020, soldiers from the regiment were featured alongside leaders of the National Corps in a video ad for a rally meant as a warning to Zelenskyy’s government. Based on this evidence, it is clear that the Regiment has failed in its alleged attempts to “depoliticize.” This makes it next to impossible to draw a clear line between the regiment itself and the wider Azov movement, including the National Corps. »

« What is the relationship between the Azov regiment in the National Guard and the National Corps party? Some researchers claim that the Azov regiment is independent from the movement and the party, and that it is not far-right. This is about a formal distinction between the Azov regiment and the Azov movement. I disagree with this claim. Yes, the Azov regiment is subordinate to different government bodies, namely to the National Guard. But saying that there is no relation between the regiment and the movement is ridiculous. If we look at the memorial ceremony for their comrades on the Day of the Dead which Azov holds every September, it is suspiciously reminiscent of the Nazi Cathedral of Light by Albert Speer. An eerie ritual with torches. But if we look closer, we’ll see that Azov members are holding shields with the callsigns of their fellow soldiers who died in 2014. The shields feature the Azov logo—they’re still claiming that it’s not a “Wolfsangel.” There’s also a “black sun” on the shields. I look at this and think, “Do you really want to convince people that the regiment under the same name, which uses far-right symbols and still invites Andriy Biletsky to give solemn speeches, and the movement are independent phenomena? Then why, when anti-fascists hold banners demanding to disband the Azov regiment, the radical right lose their minds in anger?” I think that the myth that there is no connection between the Azov regiment and the Azov movement has been promoted since 2019 by the regiment’s supporters who want to defend it from attacks by promoting this myth. »

« Delineating between 'official' and 'unofficial' affiliates and subgroups of the Azov movement isn't a straightforward task. This is particularly the case because, as I show below, many 'official' initiatives themselves blur the lines by having clear relationships and links with 'unofficial' initiatives, and vice versa. Nonetheless, criteria that can be used to try and make this distinction should focus on whether the affiliate carries the branding of the Azov movement, particularly of the National Corps, or whether it is explicitly patronized and promoted by senior leaders of the movement. »

« In winter 2015, veterans and volunteers of the regiment created the Azov Civil Corps and thereby started to expand their political grouping into a multi-faceted social movement. In 2016, Bilets'kyy formed the political party National Corps, drawing membership from the Azov Civil Corps and veterans of the Azov Battalion and Regiment. In January 2018, an offshoot of the Azov movement, the unarmed vigilante organization National Squads, became a Ukrainian media sensation after it held a visually impressive public torch march. Further sub-organizations and branches of the Azov movement have emerged since 2014. They include entities such as the Engineering Corps, Cossack House, Plomin (Flame) Literary Club, Orden (Order) circle, Youth Corps, Intermarium Support Group, and others. While being partly independent, the fronts and subunits of the Azov movement share basic stances on certain political issues, closely cooperate with each other, and accept Bilets'kyy as the unofficial leader of the entire coalition. As a result, Azov is now a multi-dimensional socio-political movement that is developing in a variety of directions. »

« Unlike the rest of the Azov movement, the Regiment functions under different legal authority as part of Ukraine's interior ministry. Still, it would be a mistake to claim because of this that the Azov Regiment is somehow not part of the ... »

« While the far-right worldview of the Azov movement is clear, there has been an intense debate on whether the Azov Battalion should be classed a "foreign terrorist organization" by the US Department of State. "People always assume it (the Azov regiment and Azov movement) is one Death Star," Rekawek said. "Year by year, the connections (between the regiment and the movement) are looser," he said, explaining that the battalion's ranks now include Ukrainians who have no affinity with its neo-Nazi past. Ritzmann says the far-right element in Ukraine's army is no different to what's been detected in other militaries, such as in Germany and the US. "Presumably, far-right extremists serve in the Ukrainian military as they do in all other militaries -- valid data regarding the exact numbers are not available," he said.

"Back in 2015, the Azov Regiment itself claimed to have between 10% and 20% far-right extremists in their ranks," but those figures are possibly smaller today, he said. But the regiment still uses the Wolfsangel symbol, and leaders of the Azov movement, who used to be commanders in the unit, continue to visit it, said Oleksiy Kuzmenko, a Ukrainian-American investigative journalist focusing on the Ukrainian far-right. "The current leader of the Azov Regiment, Denis 'Redis' Prokopenko, is part of the core of the Azov movement since 2014, and served under commanders who went on to lead the Azov movement political and street wings," Kuzmenko told CNN. Prokopenko's deputy, Svyatoslav "Kalyna" Palamar, has explicitly praised the movement's founder, Biletsky, as "a leader who 'finds sponsors that really invest money' into the regiment," Kuzmenko said.

Kuzmenko points out that as of 2021, the regiment was "actively involved in the training of the movement's youth leaders," and its website has a link to the movement's YouTube channel. "Ukraine and (the) West's inaction on these issues paved the way for Putin to quite literally weaponize them against Ukraine in an attempt to justify his aggression," Kuzmenko said. "While it's correct to point (out that) Ukraine's far-right has minimal electoral support, they (Azov) have enjoyed near impunity for violence aimed at minorities, were unchecked in their efforts to build influence in military and security forces, and have been normalized by Ukraine's senior leaders," he said. »

« Members of the Azov Battalion, the National Corps, and the National Militia appear to flow between the three branches.[52] Since the creation of all three groups - the Azov Battalion, the National Corps, and the National Militia - collectively they are often referred to as the “Azov Movement”. »

La référence 52 dans le passage précédent fait référence à cette source-ci de Bellingcat en 2018:

« Members of Azov movement appear to flow between three branches with ease and all three organizations pursue the same ultra-nationalist, far-right political ideology. »

« the interviewed members of the Ukrainian Azov movement (which comprises not only the regiment but also a political party, paramilitary unit, a charity, and intellectual and social wings)26 »

« Q: The fact that Azov is a far-right movement doesn’t pose a problem for them?

A: They take part in Azov trainings not because they’re happy to hang out with a far-right group, but because they either don’t know or, in light of the situation, don’t care. Perhaps they believe the soft media coverage of Azov in Ukraine and don’t think they’re far-right at all.

Q: Azov also aspires to be more than the mere voluntary battalion it was established as following the revolution and subsequent war in 2014…

A: Exactly. It was able to use its own affiliated military unit within the National Guard as a branding and recruitment tool around which to build a broader movement, which consists of the Azov Regiment, the National Militia (subsequently rebranded as Centuria), and the National Corps Party. This has also allowed them to operate with a degree of impunity and openness that many other far-right groups worldwide cannot. »

« For one, the letter incorrectly refers to the Azov Battalion. The military unit once known as the Azov Battalion, formed in 2014 to combat Russian-backed insurgents in a still-hot war in eastern Ukraine, has been under the auspices of Ukraine’s National Guard and properly known as the Azov Regiment for years. While referring to it as the “Azov Battalion” could be excusable as something a commentator without experience in Ukraine might mention in passing, it’s not so excusable in an official letter demanding that said organization be designated as a terror group. In particular, how can a group be designated if it can’t even be named and identified correctly?

The accurate descriptor would, of course, be the “Azov Movement.” I’ve described the Azov Movement, which grew out of the original battalion and regiment, as a heterogenous radical-right social movement. At its core, the movement encompasses the regiment itself, the National Corps political party, the Centuria (formerly the National Militia) paramilitary organization as well as a number of affiliated subgroups and initiatives including a book club, youth camps, a “leadership school” and a (temporarily closed) three-story social center just off Kyiv’s central Independence Square.

It also encompasses organizations and networks that are clearly led by and are made up of members of the movement who appear to function with some degree of independence, often without any stated relationship to the movement and who are more open or extreme in their rhetoric. There are also smaller radical-right organizations that are nominally independent but still appear to have at least some relationship with the movement and who circle around its orbit. »

« The Azov Regiment is part of Ukraine's broader "Azov Movement," which has at its core white supremacist and antisemitic philosophy. But the extremist-right commands support from at best perhaps 2% of the Ukrainian electorate, according to one prominent political scientist. »

« On the international stage, the party touts its ties to the Regiment in order to boost its legitimacy. »

« After that there was a separation of the movement and the regiment, which still uses right-wing symbols, but can no longer be classified as a right-wing extremist body. »

Aussi, Kuzmenko de Bellingcat décrit dans une image un "Azov's Three-Pronged Movement" incluant le Régiment Azov comme la branche paramilitaire (« Azov Regiment - Military wing, integrated into the National Guard, led by Denis Prokopenko ») et il y a d'autres branches qui ont émergé depuis leur enquête (voir Umland ou Colborne): [2]

Autre citation de Kuzmenko:

« He cites as a prominent example the Azov Special Operations Detachment, also known as the Azov Battalion or Azov Regiment. It was established by the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior after the conflict broke out in 2014, and was later transferred to the National Guard. Kuzmenko calls the regiment "a highly-capable and heavily armed unit reportedly numbering 1100 or more fighters that is also the military wing of the internationally active Azov movement." »

Idem pour Andreas Umland:

« Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies who has studied the Azov movement, said it is wrong to categorize the regiment as still a “Neo-Nazi regiment.” Certainly, there are still white supremacists and far-right extremists present in Azov, he said, but in recent years the military wing of the movement has moved away from open support of fascism. »

En fait, comme le rappelle Colborne, « in 2019 the movement’s former international spokesperson publicly described the Azov Regiment as the “military wing” of the Azov movement ».

Le Time Magazine le qualifie de même: « Azov's military wing »

Azov est donc décrit comme un sous-ensemble du mouvement Azov, plus précisément "la branche paramilitaire du mouvement Azov", avec les mêmes membres formés et formant le régiment Azov dirigeant les autres branches du mouvement Azov, notant par ailleurs la grande part de liberté donné au régiment:

« Nevertheless, the story about Ukraine’s initially ir- or semiregular armed volunteer movement did not end with its almost full incorporation and partial dispersion into the regular Ukrainian armed forces. A whole number of the initial leaders that shaped and were shaped by the paramilitary units and their civic support groups kept in contact with, or even advanced within, those political, governmental, civil or commercial structures which had initially given birth to, or supported the formation of, the IAGs. Some selected volunteer units – most prominently the infamous Azov Regiment10, on which there is more below – kept a part of their staff, identity, symbols and exclusiveness after their incorporation into the troops of the Ministries of Interior or Defense. A number of decommissioned commanders and privates started to participate, or even became prominent in, the development of post-Maidan Ukrainian politics, government and society. »

Au final dans toutes les publications, Azov est souvent utilisé pour décrire de façon interchangeable le mouvement ou le régiment ou d'autres branches:

« Yet, Azov’s transformation into a larger venture combining an armed regiment with a political party and supposedly non-political self-help movement raises concerns. It may mean that the Azov phenomenon will eventually have to be re-evaluated within the framework of uncivil movement as well as right-wing extremism studies, and the peculiar threats that groups falling under these headings pose for the consolidation and development of democracy. »

Ou même amalgament explicitement les deux pour couper court à la mésinterprétation:

« far-right Azov movement/Regiment »

Pour une perspective, c'est parce que le mouvement Azov n'existe que comme le prolongement du régiment Azov:

« The movement grew out of the Azov Regiment (originally a Battalion) »

« I’d describe the movement like this: it’s a multi-pronged, heterogeneous far-right social movement that grew out of its namesake military unit, the Azov Regiment, and exert at least some influence on Ukrainian politics and society despite its small numbers (e.g., at most 20,000 members estimated at some points in the past). It continues, even during the current invasion, to evolve and grow and adapt, and is probably one of the most PR-savvy far-right movements I’ve ever seen. »

« It was able to use its own affiliated military unit within the National Guard as a branding and recruitment tool around which to build a broader movement, which consists of the Azov Regiment, the National Militia (subsequently rebranded as Centuria), and the National Corps Party. »

« An entire movement has developed around the Azov Battalion in recent years. The goal is to establish a global coalition of right-wing extremist groups, Semenyaka said in a 2019 interview with Time magazine.24 »

et de ses réussites militaires presque mythologiques comme l'écrit Colborne (voir également plus bas pour la citation, chercher "myth", et aussi « This real or presumed savior-role of the IAGs » de Umland):

« [traduction automatique] Ils regardent l'Ukraine et Azov avec respect, bien qu'en réalité l'ampleur des réalisations d'Azov soit grandement exagérée. C'est de la publicité vide, un mélange de mythe et de réalité », a déclaré Colborn. Les membres du mouvement Azov eux-mêmes ont beaucoup contribué à la création de ce mythe, invitant activement l'extrême droite occidentale à visiter l'Ukraine. »

« At the same time, many of the foreign far right still see Azov as the ideal model of a far-right movement. This perception is partly based on myth and partly on real facts. Even now, the Western far right, particularly the French and the Germans, write about Ukraine as a place where you can simply come, get a gun and go to the front right away. But it hasn’t worked like that for a few years now! »

Même si les spécialistes essayent en général de préciser de quelle branche il s'agit pour être précis, ils continuent de les décrire comme étant "Azov". Cela s'explique par l'histoire de la génèse du mouvement:

« Although Azov itself has become fully integrated into the National Guard and thereby a combat unit of the Ministry of Interior, its creators have recently started a new comprehensive party-political project and non-governmental movement that goes beyond the confines of national security, patriotic mobilization, and military defense. With the creation of the Azov-linked political party Natsional’nyy korpus (National Corps), non-governmental organization Tsyvil’nyy korpus (Civil Corps), and unarmed militias Natsional’nyy druzhyny (National Fellowships) in 2015–2017, the Azov founders may be returning to their roots in the Patriot of Ukraine and Social-National Assembly. Perhaps, these new initiatives are ideologically sufficiently dissimilar from the SNA/PU to be also classified as permutations of neo-Nazism; perhaps, not. Future research will have to show. »

Azov est-il d'extrême-droite?

Le début de cette section est barrée car on va passer sur cet argument accusé de travail inédit (ou plutôt synthèse inédite), et se recentrer sur les différents avis d'experts.

Attaquons l'éléphant dans la pièce: les deux articles de l'AFP et des Décodeurs de Le Monde.

D'abord la dépêche AFP, qui cite Umland:

« En 2014, ce bataillon avait effectivement un fond d'extrême droite. Mais le régiment s'est ensuite +dé-idéologisé+, il est devenu une unité régulière", explique Andreas Umland, expert au Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. »

J'ai trouvé cela étonnant, étant donné qu'Umland a publié plusieurs articles entre 2019 et 2021 où il qualifie constamment Azov de "far-right movement", jusque dans le titre même dans l'article, et même le décrivant comme le plus grand mouvement de cette mouvance actuellement en Ukraine et dans le monde (voir les citations plus haut dans la section sur l'histoire du mouvement et du régiment Azov).

Voyons voir la même dépêche de l'AFP, mais en anglais:

« “In 2014 this battalion had indeed a far-right background, these were far-right racists that founded the battalion,” said Andreas Umland at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies. But it had since become “de-ideologized” and a regular fighting unit, he said. »

Il y a un passage crucial qui a donc été coupé en français, mentionnant l'idéologie xénophobe d'extrême-droite, euphémisme pour néonazi. Ensuite, quand il parle de "de-ideologized", on comprend alors que cela fait référence à "far-right racists", et pas juste à "far-right background". AFP en français a donc fait un détournement de source en coupant la citation... Ça arrive, ce n'est pas la 1ère fois, c'est pour cela que WP:SP recommande de remonter à la source spécialiste de préférence.

Deuxième cas d'étude: l'article des Décodeurs de Le Monde:

« Pour Michael Colborne, chercheur et journaliste pour le site d’enquête Bellingcat et auteur d’un livre publié en 2022 (en anglais) sur « le mouvement Azov », seule une minorité des soldats du régiment sont aujourd’hui portés par des idées d’extrême droite ou néonazies. »

Encore plus facile: Michael Colborne a écrit un livre, que les Décodeurs citent et lient d'ailleurs, centré sur Azov (mouvement ET régiment), voici le texte de couverture:

« From its roots in revolution and war, Ukraine's Azov movement has grown from a militia of fringe far-right figures and football hooligans fending off Russian-backed forces into a multipronged social movement that has become the envy of the global far right. »

Dans le contenu, voici la probable source du passage:

« There are several hundred thousand veterans of the war across Ukraine, of whom only a small minority hold far-right views, have any connection to the far right or are willing to join a far-right movement. »

Et voici d'autres passages, même s'il faudrait davantage creuser:

« Scholars usually use one of two terms to refer to groups or individuals on the far right: 'radical right' ... using the term 'extreme' (i.e., 'far-right extremist') is more than justified in the context of the Azov movement »

« "Azov's heart is based on its right-wing ideology. It's the legacy of Patriot of Ukraine" (quoted in Reporting Radicalism, 2021). These neo-Nazis, as well as others within the Azov movement, have plenty of positive things to say about ... »

Il y a aussi son interview où Colborne décrit très clairement Azov comme étant un mouvement d'extrême-droite (« far-right ») dans la lignée de ceux italiens et des balkans et fait part de ses doutes sur la repentance néonazi d'Azov (voir plus haut pour la citation).

Ailleurs, il qualifie Azov de « mouvement néonazi-friendly » et dit ceci dans une interview dans New Statesman plus récente que son livre:

« The basics: Ukraine’s far right, particularly the Azov movement, has long been able to operate with a degree of impunity and openness that makes it the envy of its international peers. The movement grew out of the Azov Regiment (originally a Battalion), formed in the chaos of war in early 2014 by a ragtag group of far-right thugs, football hooligans and international hangers-on — including dozens of Russian citizens — becoming an official unit of Ukraine’s National Guard. [...] What even makes up the Azov movement can depend on who you ask. In 2019 the movement’s former international spokesperson publicly described the Azov Regiment as the “military wing” of the Azov movement. These days the regiment and its defenders act like it’s a totally unrelated entity, but one that still openly recruits at movement events; witness the Azov movement leader Andriy Biletsky, the regiment’s first commander, at its cultlike yearly honouring of its fallen. »

Bellingcat, comme je le décrit plus bas, est aussi à l'origine de nombreuses révélations sur le réseau mondial d'extrême-droite et de néonazis qu'Azov a tissé, et ses analystes ne mâchent pas leurs mots pour qualifier Azov de néonazi (voir plus bas).

Donc encore un détournement de source...

Pour en revenir aux sources de spécialistes, toutes décrivent Azov comme "far-right" au minimum, et "néonazi" au maximum. Pour Umland: « far-right organizations maintain a presence on the landscape of Ukraine's extra-parliamentary party politics, its NGO sector, its cultural life, local affairs, and (in some cases) foreign relations. Since Svoboda had cut most of its ties to European far-right parties by 2014, the latter refers primarily to the international connections of the Azov movement and other, smaller far-right groups. ». Il va même plus loin ailleurs: « the Azov movement [...] arguably represent the largest long-term domestic right-wing extremist threat to Ukraine's democracy ». Pour le Soufan Center, Azov est même un « noeud critique dans le réseau d'extrême-droite violent transnational ». Pour Alexander Ritzmann, a senior adviser at the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) à Berlin, « The Azov movement is a dangerous key player of the transnational extreme-right and has served as a network hub for several years now, with strong ties to far-right extremists in many European Union countries and the United States » mais l'armée ukrainienne (pas le régiment) n'inclut qu'une minorité d'éléments d'extrême droite, pas plus que dans d'autres armées comme celle des États-Unis ou l'Allemagne selon lui. D'après le Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University (source citée par: ):

« The Azov Battalion is an extreme-right nationalist paramilitary organization based in Ukraine. [...] During the Battle for Mariupol, the group came to attention for its neo-Nazi iconography on the battlefield including the battalion patch, which featured a Wolfsangel symbol.[13] The Wolsfangel is a historical symbol of independence that was later co-opted by the German Nazi Party. Originally, Biletsky’s PU claimed the symbol was actually an amalgamation of the letters “I” and “N” (the Idea of the Nation), representing the organization’s nationalist beliefs. However, the symbol is widely associated with the modern far-right.[14] Azov leaders publicly downplay or deny the group as a white supremacist or Neo-Nazi organization. The Azov Battalion denies the symbol’s far-right associations and invokes the reasoning as the PU.[15] However, the Woflsangel is far from Azov’s only allusion to Nazi ideology. Biletsky once stated in 2010 that it was Ukraine’s national mission to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade…against semite-led untermenschen (subhumans)”[16] Furthermore, interviews with members of the Battalion openly espouse neo-Nazi and white supremacist views. Many fighters hold an aspirational belief of marching on Kyiv once the war is over, and that Ukraine “needs a strong dictator to come to power who could shed plenty of blood but unite the nation in the process.”[17] [...] In 2015, as intermittent fighting in Donbas continued, the U.S. government placed a ban on any of its material or financial aid to Ukraine going to the Azov Battalion due to its far-right association. While the ban was lifted in 2016, Congress reinstated it again as part of a Defense Appropriations bill in 2018.[35] »

Le Congrès américain considère donc toujours à ce jour que le Régiment Azov est d'extrême-droite. Le Congrès américain à réintroduit l'interdiction dans le Defense Appropriations bill de 2018 et est restée depuis. La décision américaine a eu un effet mondial d'après le Time Magazine:

« The U.S. government was also slow to acknowledge the danger of Ukraine’s far-right militias. But by March 2018, the U.S. Congress publicly denounced the Azov Battalion, banning the U.S. government from providing any “arms, training or other assistance” to its fighters. Though largely symbolic, the move discouraged all Western military forces, and especially members of the NATO alliance, from training alongside Azov fighters— or indeed having anything to do with them. It was a deep blow to morale, especially in Azov’s military wing, says Svyatoslav Palamar, one of its top commanders. »

Pour Kacper Rekawek, a research fellow with the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo, « "People always assume it (the Azov regiment and Azov movement) is one Death Star," Rekawek said. "Year by year, the connections (between the regiment and the movement) are looser," he said, explaining that the battalion's ranks now include Ukrainians who have no affinity with its neo-Nazi past. »

Pour Oleksiy Kuzmenko, chercheur indépendant pour Bellingcat, le régiment Azov est un régiment de « Far-Right Fighters, White Supremacists » et décrit:

« far-right Azov movement/Regiment »

.

Voici fin février 2022 ce que dit Michael Colborne, décrit par Belltower.News comme « leads Bellingcat Monitoring and was, until recently, Policy and Practitioner Fellow at the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). He researches and writes about the far right in central and eastern Europe. His articles have appeared in Haaretz, Al Jazeera and The New Republic. His book From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right will be released in March 2022 »:

« Belltower.News: Putin has formally recognized the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent nations and has sent Russian troops on a “peacekeeping” mission. Europe is on the brink of war. What does this mean for the far right in Ukraine?

Michael Colborne: Azov is the primary far-right movement in Ukraine and has consolidated its presence to the point that little exists outside of it: first as a voluntary battalion, then as a street vigilante group and political party. And it’s taking advantage of the current situation. The Azov Regiment has put out an appeal to recruit soldiers, as well as sharing its banking information for donations. It also wants to present itself as a “mainstream”, patriotic player. The narrative is, they’re veterans who know what they’re doing. For the past month, Azov has been heavily promoting civil defence training across the country, for example at the end of January in Kyiv. More and more Ukrainians, especially in big cities, are thinking about how to defend themselves if it comes to the worst, to a full scale invasion.

Q: The fact that Azov is a far-right movement doesn’t pose a problem for them?

A: They take part in Azov trainings not because they’re happy to hang out with a far-right group, but because they either don’t know or, in light of the situation, don’t care. Perhaps they believe the soft media coverage of Azov in Ukraine and don’t think they’re far-right at all.

[...]

Q: Azov also aspires to be more than the mere voluntary battalion it was established as following the revolution and subsequent war in 2014…

A: Exactly. It was able to use its own affiliated military unit within the National Guard as a branding and recruitment tool around which to build a broader movement, which consists of the Azov Regiment, the National Militia (subsequently rebranded as Centuria), and the National Corps Party. This has also allowed them to operate with a degree of impunity and openness that many other far-right groups worldwide cannot. »

C'est en ligne avec ce qu'il écrivait avant.

Il y a un seul auteur qui semble être en désaccord avec la qualification de "far-right" pour le régiment Azov, Anton Shekhovtsov, spécialiste ukrainien (collègue de Umland) de l'extrême-droite européenne et en particulier ses liens avec la Russie:

« Shekhovtsov argues that the National Corps should be taken out of the debate about the Azov Regiment because “Azov attempted to depoliticize itself; the toxic far-right leadership formally left the regiment”. »

« But, while the ideologically inimical nature of Azov’s roots is indisputable, it is likewise certain that Azov attempted to de-politicize itself; the toxic far-right leadership formally left the regiment and founded what would become a far-right party called “National Corps.” »

Au final, refs non exhaustives, mais il faut comparer avec le nombre de spécialistes qui démentent qu'Azov est "far-right": un seul dans mes recherches (je n'utilisais pas ce mot-clé ni nazi, j'ai cherché Azov + nom des spécialistes, ou je fouillais les sources citées dans ces articles de spécialistes).

Outre la qualification de "far-right" agréé par tous les spécialistes, il est à noter qu'Umland et d'autres qualifient en plus Azov de « mouvement non-civil » (« uncivil movement »), c'est une caractérisation qui a un intérêt théorique pour l'analyser.

Mais attention, il faut bien différencier l'idéologie du régiment et du mouvement Azov de ses membres: tous les membres qui rejoignent Azov ne le font pas forcément par idéologie politique, mais avant tout pour l'aura et les succès militaire (la gloire de la Patrie quoi -- "Motherland" en anglais comme dans la Stratégie pour l'éducation militaro-patriotique des autorités Ukrainiennes, voir plus bas), mais il y a une endoctrination qui se fait:

« De nombreux volontaires s’engagent dans le régiment Azov sans pour autant être militants d’extrême droite. « [Le] rejoindre (…) n’était qu’un moyen de se battre pour leur pays de la façon qu’ils jugeaient la plus efficace, écrivait, en 2016, Viatcheslav Likhatchev, historien et expert en sciences politiques, dans une note de l’Institut français des relations internationales. Cependant, toutes les nouvelles recrues étaient endoctrinées aux idées d’extrême droite, souvent xénophobes. » »

La source originale apporte plus d'éclairage:

« Military operations were at their most active for just a year, from spring 2014 to spring 2015. Yet the situation in the conflict zone has affected and continues to affect society and politics in Russia and, even more so, in Ukraine. By participating in the conflict, ultra-nationalist groups and their adherents receive weapons and experience, grow more organised and build up social capital. Whatever public support they now enjoy is clearly attributable to them being perceived as "defenders" of their homeland, not bearers of a far-right ideology. Nevertheless, lionising individual ideologues indirectly helps to legitimise their ideology in public discourse as a whole, which naturally arouses fear among observers. »

Azov est-il ultranationaliste?

Toutes les réfs vont dans ce sens, et même Azov ne s'en cache pas, c'est bien entendu le coeur de leur existence: protéger la nation avant tout.

« While not having – unlike Azov or the DUK – an ultra-nationalist background, “Donbas” was one of the more radical and politically engaged IAGs as early as 2014. »

« Yet there are at least four features of -- and developments in -- Ukraine's post-Euromaidan ultra-nationalist milieu that give reason for pause [...] Since Svoboda had cut most of its ties to European far-right parties by 2014, the latter refers primarily to the international connections of the Azov movement and other, smaller far-right groups. »

« Dans son article de 2016, l’historien ukrainien Viatcheslav Likhatchev écrivait : « Azov est l’exemple le plus éclatant de la légalisation, voire de l’héroïsation, de l’ultranationalisme dans le discours public ukrainien. » »

« It's hard not to see outlines of Azov in this definition, particularly in the way that the nation is the highest priority -- like in the "Ukraine above all" slogan for National Corps and partners' 2019 parliamentary election campaign »

Azov est-il toujours néonazi?

Alternativement, la question est posée sous la forme de: "est-ce que Azov est dépolitisé?" Car faisant référence systématiquement clairement à son passé nazi, et non d'extrême-droite qui est toujours très présent et qu'aucun auteur ne nie.

On va passer sur les origines néonazi que personne ne nie pour se focaliser ici sur la question de sa qualification contemporaine en tant que groupe néonazi, ou pas.

Pour Umland, Likhatchev et selon les membres et porte-paroles d'Azov (qui donnent la seule estimation connue de 10-20% de nazis membres), c'est non, car le mouvement se distance officiellement de l'idéologie néonazie (à noter que je regroupe Likhatchev avec Umland car non seulement ils ont une position proche, mais Umland cite ÉNORMÉMENT Likhatchev dans ses ouvrages, ils semblent donc pas mal collaborer académiquement ensemble):

« Selon Adrien Nonjon, chercheur à l'université George Washington134 et à l’Inalco spécialiste de l’Ukraine, le bataillon Azov connaît une forme de dépolitisation depuis son intégration à la garde nationale par le ministère de l’Intérieur ukrainien : « leurs rangs ont grossi avec des Ukrainiens dépolitisés simplement admiratifs de leurs réussites au combat. Andreï Biletsky lui-même, après avoir quitté le commandement d’Azov pour la présidence du parti politique d’extrême droite Corps national, a beaucoup lissé son discours. Il nie les mots très durs qu’il a tenus dans sa jeunesse lorsqu’il parlait de croisade contre les sémites »1. Il souligne notamment la présence, outre les néonazis, « de monarchistes, d'orthodoxes, de païens et d'écofascistes»135. »

« Once it became an official part of the state, the Azov Battalion distanced itself from neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideology, and its far-right leadership left the regiment. But interviews with individual members, its use of insignia that was also used as a Nazi symbol, assessments from experts and recent social media video posts from the group clearly show continued anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, antisemitic and white supremacist views among its fighters. »

« And those experts said there are also signs the Azov regiment has shed some of its troubled past, moving away from at least overt support for the white supremacy its founders believed in. »

« Vyacheslav Likhachev, a member of the Expert Council of the Center for Civil Liberties in Ukraine, scoffed at the idea that the Azov regiment still has neo-Nazi leanings, calling it “stupid” and “outdated”. "Asked about the numerous visits from European and U.S. white supremacists and neo-Nazis to the Azov Regiment, Likhachev acknowledged that, for a while, the regiment was considered “a free space paradise for neo-Nazis from all over the world,” but he said reports that those neo-Nazi war tourists were ever active in Azov were overblown. “Those who came under the illusion that they will be Azov fighters, they mostly spent some time here in Ukraine and, if they were lucky they made some photos with weapons which they took in their hands for five minutes,” Likhachev said. “Then they drank some good and cheap Ukrainian beer and went back home.” »

« Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies who has studied the Azov movement, said it is wrong to categorize the regiment as still a “Neo-Nazi regiment.” Certainly, there are still white supremacists and far-right extremists present in Azov, he said, but in recent years the military wing of the movement has moved away from open support of fascism. The presence of the Azov regiment in the Ukrainian military has long represented a practical dilemma for the Ukrainian government, Umland said. The regiment has built a reputation as a force capable of protecting the public from adversaries. “People sign up because these are the tough guys,” Umland said. Umland also pointed out an uncomfortable truth: In times of war, a country needs soldiers who will do battle against their enemies, and often the most willing people to fight on the front lines are ultranationalists schooled in jingoistic pride. “If you’re going to fight a war, who is going to fight it? For war, you need a certain type of people,” he said. “The people who are willing to do that are the ultranationalists.“ »

« As the Azov Regiment assimilated into Ukraine’s National Guard, some of its most infamous leaders left to create the Azov Civil Corps, later the National Corps.Gartenstein-Ross said the regiment seems to have eschewed some of its most extremist elements in the intervening years. “I'm not saying that it's reformed, but it actually became part of the state military,” he said. “I put a question mark there, giving some possibility that the Azov regiment has changed in cognizable ways.” »

« Yet from the perspective of Ukraine's fledgling democracy, the most dangerous such phenomenon may not be S14, Svoboda or the now thoroughly marginalized Right Sector, but instead the multi-faceted Azov movement [...]. While it would be going too far to classify the Azov Regiment as a terrorist organization, its various political and "uncivil" spin-off associations arguably represent the largest long-term domestic right-wing extremist threat to Ukraine's democracy. Unlike previous Ukrainian far-right projects, the Azov movement has managed to create a multi-dimensional and distinctly modern (and even post-modern) identity that has particular appeal to the young and is not regionally limited. It cooperates closely with like-minded groups abroad, including certain Russian neo-Nazi groups. [...] Azov is a dynamic uncivil movement that is actively advancing on different domestic fronts and strengthening its foreign contacts. It has become a visible part of the international groupuscular right, and maintains links to uncivil (mainly racist) organizations in the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, among others. »

Anciennes déclarations des officiels d'Azov:

« But a spokesman for the group has defended it, telling USA Today in 2015 that only 10 to 20 percent of recruits are neo-Nazis and that those people do not represent the official ideology of Azov. »

Déclarations récentes des officiels d'Azov:

« In a statement to CNN, the Azov regiment said it "appreciates and respects Andriy Biletsky as the regiment's founder and first commander, but we have nothing to do with his political activities and the National Corps party" -- adding the former commander never made such comments. The statement said that Azov's "motivation has always angered Russia. Therefore, disinformation attacks on the AZOV Regiment have not stopped since 2014." It added that the movement has "repeatedly denied allegations of fascism, nazism and racism," and have Ukrainians of all different backgrounds including "Greeks, Jews, Crimean Tatars, Russians" who "continue to serve in AZOV." "Most of them are Russian-speaking, most are Orthodox. But there are Catholics and Protestants, Pagans and those who profess Islam and Judaism, and there are atheists," Azov asserted. It noted that the Azov regiment's role is as "a special unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, and is subordinated exclusively to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief -- the President of Ukraine, by the way, a Jew." "It would be absurd to think that we are united by the idea of white racism or nazism," the Azov statement added. Despite the Azov movement's international notoriety, Ukraine "is not a cesspit for Nazi sympathizers," according to Alexander Ritzmann, a senior adviser at the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), based in Berlin. [...] In a statement to CNN on Wednesday, Prokopenko said: "Whoever calls us Nazis is deeply mistaken. We have young brave soldiers who give their lives for the independence of Ukraine and throw themselves under enemy tanks." »

Sinon, pour beaucoup d'autres, c'est clairement oui:

« The Azov Regiment is definitely a nasty crew,” said Heidi Beirich, co-founder of the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism. “They’ve had a high neo-Nazi presence, there’s documented antisemitism. »

Selon le Time Magazine:

« The main recruitment center for Azov, known as the Cossack House, stands in the center of Kyiv, a four-story brick building on loan from Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. In the courtyard is a cinema and a boxing club. The top floor hosts a lecture hall and a library, full of books by authors who supported German fascism, like Ezra Pound and Martin Heidegger, or whose works were co-opted by Nazi propaganda, like Friedrich Nietzsche and Ernst Jünger. On the ground floor is a shop called Militant Zone, which sells clothes and key chains with stylized swastikas and other neo-Nazi merchandise. [...] It might seem ironic for this hub of white nationalists to be situated in Ukraine. At one point in 2019, it was the only nation in the world, apart from Israel, to have a Jewish President and a Jewish Prime Minister. Far-right politicians failed to win a single seat in parliament in the most recent elections. But in the context of the white-supremacist movement globally, Azov has no rivals on two important fronts: its access to weapons and its recruiting power. »

Pour Colborne, Azov est un

« dangereux mouvement extrémiste néonazi-friendly [avec] des ambitions mondiales »

Il ne cache pas qu'il est dubitatif concernant les déclarations qu'ils ne sont plus néonazis.

Pour Oleksiy Kuzmenko, chercheur pour le projet Bellingcat Anti-Equality Monitoring, « the Azov Regiment has not depoliticized ».

Pour Eric Aunoble, chercheur spécialiste de l'URSS, en 2022, « le fond idéologique de ce bataillon relève clairement du néonazisme ». »

Pour le Soufan Center, centre spécialisé dans l'analyse des risques extrêmistes et terroristes, Azov est un mouvement de suprémasisme blanc et de noeud de l'extrême-droite violent transnational.

Pour le Center for Countering Digital Hate, Azov est néonazi.

« Des membres du groupe ont perpétré une série d’attaques violentes à l’encontre de minorités, dont des Roms et des personnes LGBTQ, au cours des dernières années, ce qui a conduit le ministère américain des Affaires étrangères à cataloguer Azov parmi les « groupes nationalistes haineux ». »

Les journalistes de Liberation Fact Check émettent également des réserves, après avoir constaté eux-mêmes les messages et iconographies néonazis sur les canaux Telegram liés à Azov: « CheckNews a consulté des groupes de communications officiels du régiment, ainsi que différents canaux de groupes territoriaux, dédiés à l’échange ou au recrutement. Dans les photos partagées par les relais institutionnalisés, les combattants sont plus discrets sur leurs patchs ou leurs tatouages. On peut néanmoins en voir plusieurs arborer ostensiblement des soleils noirs nazis sur la crosse de leurs fusils ou sur leurs gilets balistiques. Dans certains canaux d’échanges, où ne sont pas seulement présents des membres d’Azov mais aussi des sympathisants d’autres pays, la parole est parfois plus libérée : «Heil Hitler», «Sieg Heil». ».

Les journalistes de Vice, qui ont fait une enquête sur le sujet, résument: « Si Azov a publiquement essayé de minimiser l’importance de ses éléments extrémistes, la radicalité de ses opinions est irréfutable. Plusieurs membres de ce régiment se déclarent ouvertement favorables à l’idéologie suprémaciste blanche et certains arborent des tatouages néo-nazis. [...] « [Leur idéologie extrémiste] est irréfutable, étant donné que l’on trouve des photos de leurs gars avec des swastikas, » déclarait Skillt, qui a, depuis, renoncé à ses idéaux extrémistes. » (nota bene: Skillt est un mercenaire étranger qui a rejoint Azov pendant la guerre russo-ukrainienne)

Pour Antoine-Louis de Prémonville, Docteur en lettres et civilisations, Antoine-Louis de Prémonville est officier de l’armée de terre, pour la revue Conflits: « En effet, qu’il s’agisse des allusions à ce régiment Azov – unité appartenant à la garde nationale et à l’iconographie « fleurie[1] » – repaire notoire de néo-nazis[2] agrégant depuis de nombreuses années les volontaires néo-fascistes européens[3], ou de photographies de résistantes ukrainiens mises à l’honneur par l’OTAN – et aussitôt supprimée – à l’occasion de la journée de la femme, mais arborant des symboles douteux de sinistre mémoire[4], force est de reconnaître que la mémoire du national-socialisme en Ukraine ne souffre pas de ce rejet unanime et implacable que lui vouent les professionnels du devoir d’ingérence humanitaire et de la lutte contre l’oppression sous toutes ses formes. En l’espèce, s’il semble difficile d’estimer la proportion réelle de néonazis en Ukraine – indéniablement minoritaires –, la question qui mérite d’être posée ab initio concerne les raisons de ces réminiscences. »

Pour Kuzmenko:

« Kuzmenko has published a number of materials on the matter in outlets such as Bellingcat, the Atlantic Council and George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. He argued that "the proliferation of white nationalist ideology in the military and security forces of Ukraine is an understudied topic."

"Since the 2014 Maidan revolution, the government, military and security forces have institutionalized in its ranks former militias and volunteer battalions linked to neo-Nazi ideology," Kuzmenko told Newsweek. "Without screening for extremist ties or views, their integration has not led to depoliticization and/or dissolution once incorporated within the larger body of the government military and security forces."

He cites as a prominent example the Azov Special Operations Detachment, also known as the Azov Battalion or Azov Regiment. It was established by the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior after the conflict broke out in 2014, and was later transferred to the National Guard. Kuzmenko calls the regiment "a highly-capable and heavily armed unit reportedly numbering 1100 or more fighters that is also the military wing of the internationally active Azov movement." »

Il faut garder en tête que le régiment Azov est "unique même comparé aux autres bataillons", tant par son énorme autonomie qui inspire (partiellement à tort) les groupes d'extrême-droite du monde entier, que par ses conceptions racistes:

« In the foreign media, particularly the Russian propaganda outlets, but at times also in Western reporting, Azov is sometimes presented as the archetypical example of Ukraine’s voluntary battalions. Well-informed observers, some of whom are quoted below, in contrast, have highlighted the peculiarity of Azov as well as the difficulty of applying, in general, a single over-arching political classification and interpretation to the volunteers movement. For example, following some journalistic research, Shaun Walker concluded: “The Azov [fighters] are a minority among the Ukrainian forces, and even they, however unpleasant their views may be, are not anti-Russian; in fact the lingua franca of the battalion is Russian, and most have Russian as their first language.” 32 Some details listed hereinafter illustrate further how unusual the track records and racist views of the regiment’s leadership are compared to representatives of other battalions, even to those with ultra-nationalist tendencies. »

« The combination of unusual traits of the founders of the Azov battalion/ regiment, such as the dubious actions they were involved in before the war, the barely hidden neo-Nazism of the SNA/PU, as well as Bilets’kyy and Co’s collaboration with political provocateurs like Korchyns’kyy and Lyashko109 distinguish Azov somewhat from other new Ukrainian voluntary armed units and even from other battalions with an ultranationalist background. »

« [traduction automatique] Beaucoup d'étrangers d'extrême droite se font encore des illusions sur l'Ukraine. Ils pensent que n'importe quel nazi peut venir ici, traîner, manifester ouvertement sa position politique, ce qu'il ne peut pas se permettre chez lui, puis se retrouver comme par magie au front. En 2017-2019, le Corps national a activement développé les relations internationales. J'ai vu tous ces Allemands, Russes, Suédois, Américains, Croates, qui sont venus ici et qui ont admiré : "Cool, tu peux faire tellement de choses, et tu peux le faire !". C'est vrai dans une certaine mesure, ce qui, bien sûr, est un problème, mais ils ont une vision déformée selon laquelle la situation en 2014-2015 est toujours valable. Ils regardent l'Ukraine et Azov avec respect, bien qu'en réalité l'ampleur des réalisations d'Azov soit grandement exagérée. C'est de la publicité vide, un mélange de mythe et de réalité », a déclaré Colborn.

Les membres du mouvement Azov eux-mêmes ont beaucoup contribué à la création de ce mythe, invitant activement l'extrême droite occidentale à visiter l'Ukraine. Étant donné que de nombreuses organisations d'extrême droite en Europe se concentrent sur la Russie, les membres du Corps national s'efforcent de persuader leurs collègues de commencer à soutenir l'Ukraine.

[...]

Les nazis russes qui ont fui vers l'Ukraine étaient piégés dans leur propre idée. Le chemin du retour est fermé - il y a une prison. Il est difficile de légaliser et d'obtenir la citoyenneté en Ukraine - cela nécessite des relations et du patronage. La Reconquista et la guerre de libération n'ont jamais eu lieu : la phase chaude du conflit était terminée. L'émigration russe, à l'exception de quelques personnes, s'est retrouvée dans le "rôle de mercenaires bon marché, et même de soi-disant idiots utiles" - admet amèrement Ivan Mikheïev. Ainsi, dans des conditions d'indulgence totale de la part des autorités et d'incapacité à gagner sa vie, privé des liens sociaux habituels et enfermé à l'étranger, le nazi russe est contraint de faire ce qu'il fait le mieux : la violence et le crime. »

« Shekhovtsov describes the regiment as a regular unit of the National Guard, but it is not. Regimental commanders have said that their unit owes its special status to being shielded from government interference. In 2019, the head of Azov’s military academy claimed Biletsky protected Azov from being “destroyed” by Ukraine’s leaders, while another commander described Biletsky as someone who “finds sponsors that really invest money”. Furthermore, Azov’s Kyiv recruitment center and military academy share a location with the offices of the National Corps." »

« Its fighters resemble the other para-military units—and there are dozens of them—that have helped defend Ukraine against the Russian military over the past six years. But Azov is much more than a militia. It has its own political party; two publishing houses; summer camps for children; and a vigilante force known as the National Militia, which patrols the streets of Ukrainian cities alongside the police. Unlike its ideological peers in the U.S. and Europe, it also has a military wing with at least two training bases and a vast arsenal of weapons, from drones and armored vehicles to artillery pieces. »

« But in the context of the white-supremacist movement globally, Azov has no rivals on two important fronts: its access to weapons and its recruiting power. [...]

Biletsky’s group proved a particularly effective example, beginning its rapid rise as the Azov Battalion. The name was derived from the Sea of Azov coast, where it first saw major combat. Among the militias that formed to resist the Russian forces, Biletsky’s followers turned out to be among the most disciplined and battle-ready. “They held the line even after everybody left,” says Serhiy Taruta, a metals magnate and former governor of the frontline region of Donetsk who helped finance and equip Azov in the early months of the war. For their bravery on the battlefield, Biletsky and other Azov commanders were lauded as national heroes. “These are our best warriors,” then President Petro Poroshenko said at an award ceremony in 2014. “Our best volunteers.”

From across Europe and the U.S., dozens of fighters came to join Azov that year, many of them bearing tattoos and rap sheets earned in the neo-Nazi underground back home. The Ukrainian authorities welcomed many of them, and in some cases granted them citizenship. Within the war’s first year, Biletsky’s militia was officially absorbed into the National Guard, becoming a regiment within Ukraine’s armed forces.

That status came with an arsenal that no other far-right militia in the world could claim, including crates of explosives and battle gear for up to 1,000 troops. On prime-time talk shows in Ukraine, Biletsky and his lieutenants were treated as warrior-celebrities, and they used their fame as a springboard into politics. Biletsky won a seat in parliament in late 2014, during the first legislative elections that followed the revolution. His ambitions soon grew beyond Ukraine. Through speeches and propaganda videos posted on YouTube and widely shared on Facebook, the Azov movement began to cultivate an online profile and a distinctive aesthetic. The clips often featured torchlit marches and scenes of war, showing off the movement’s access to heavy artillery. »

Un autre argument est que Biletsky n'est plus le leader d'Azov, et donc que le régiment d'Azov n'est plus néonazi. Néanmoins, Biletsky est toujours considéré comme le leader non officiel de toute la galaxie du mouvement Azov et des "offshoots":

« While being partly independent, the fronts and subunits of the Azov movement share basic stances on certain political issues, closely cooperate with each other, and accept Bilets'kyy as the unofficial leader of the entire coalition. As a result, Azov is now a multi-dimensional socio-political movement that is developing in a variety of directions. »

Mais en plus Biletsky est toujours invité officiellement à présider des réunions solennels du mouvement et du régiment Azov, et aussi les manifestations du régiment:

« I look at this and think, “Do you really want to convince people that the regiment under the same name, which uses far-right symbols and still invites Andriy Biletsky to give solemn speeches, and the movement are independent phenomena? Then why, when anti-fascists hold banners demanding to disband the Azov regiment, the radical right lose their minds in anger?” »

« The relationship between the regiment and the National Corps is also blurred in the political messaging of Biletsky, who has posed with active duty Azov soldiers in political videos. National Corps figures routinely visit the regiment, and the party’s ideologists lecture Azov troops. Their blogs are published on the regiment’s site, while Azov’s social media pages promote the National Corps. According to an August 2017 video, ostensibly recorded at Azov’s base, emigre Russian neo-Nazi Alexey Levkin lectured the regiment. »

Concernant l'évolution idéologique de Biletsky lui-même, anciennement connu sous le nom de « White Ruler »:

« Bilets’kyi still publicly opposes multiculturalism, but admits that “to be a Ukrainian nationalist today is to believe in values, not racial prejudice”, and his new party does not use an ethnic criterion to define who can and cannot be part of the Ukrainian nation93. »

Mon interprétation de wikipédien de cette controverse: Azov il est vrai s'est distancé dans ses communications officielles de l'idéologie néonazie. Mais le mouvement, y compris le régiment, est très néonazi-friendly et même poursuit des collaborations activement (dont entrainements). Les spécialistes ne divergent pas sur ces points. Mais pour le "camp Umland", tant que le mouvement ne communique plus officiellement être favorable à cette idéologie (plus d'« open/overt support » pour le suprémacisme blanc), alors elle n'est de facto plus néonazie, quant bien même elle inclut et collabore étroitement avec des néonazis. Pour les autres, ce n'est pas la communication du mouvement qui importe mais ses liens qu'elle entretient, et donc qualifient le mouvement Azov de néonazi ou néonazi-friendly.

Quelle est l'influence nationale d'Azov?

À noter que bien que l'étude d'Umland porte sur les IAGs en général et pas qu'Azov, Azov représente d'après cet article le principal IAG en Ukraine actuellement:

« Yet from the perspective of Ukraine's fledgling democracy, the most dangerous such phenomenon may not be S14, Svoboda or the now thoroughly marginalized Right Sector, but instead the multi-faceted Azov movement, with its regular National Guard regiment and its links to the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the all-Ukrainian party National Corps, and the unarmed vigilante wing National Fellowship. While it would be going too far to classify the Azov Regiment as a terrorist organization, its various political and "uncivil" spin-off associations arguably represent the largest long-term domestic right-wing extremist threat to Ukraine's democracy. Unlike previous Ukrainian far-right projects, the Azov movement has managed to create a multi-dimensional and distinctly modern (and even post-modern) identity that has particular appeal to the young and is not regionally limited. It cooperates closely with like-minded groups abroad, including certain Russian neo-Nazi groups. [...] Azov is a dynamic uncivil movement that is actively advancing on different domestic fronts and strengthening its foreign contacts. It has become a visible part of the international groupuscular right, and maintains links to uncivil (mainly racist) organizations in the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, among others. »

« To be sure, the larger segment of the irregular armed groups’ staff had, by 2018, returned to their pre-2014 professional lives. Some are suffering from various post-traumatic syndromes, after their experience of combat, loss, injury, detention, torture etc. Yet, numerous former irregular soldiers have continued to follow the career-paths they started, accelerated, modified or sustained within the early post-Maidan armed volunteer movement. They became military or police men and women, full-time politicians or political activists as well as organisers or leaders of Ukraine’s vibrant civil and uncivil societies12. The prominence that some activists from the armed volunteer movement have gained in postEuromaidan Ukrainian national politics is, to considerable degree, build on the really or allegedly important role that this movement played or is said to have played during the early war period, especially in the volatile months from approximately April to circa September 2014. In spite of their improvised nature, the first volunteer troops – rather than the regular army, largely dysfunctional at that time – are credited to have, between the late spring and early autumn of 2014, saved Eastern Ukraine from being overrun by Russia-directed hybrid and, in late August – early September 2014, regular forces.

To be sure, the exact degree of the IAGs’ real military relevance is disputed. Yet, a notable impact of the IAGs has been asserted by Ukrainian governmental officials13, claimed by representatives of the involved right-wing groups14, and argued by certain experts alike15. At least, there is thus a widely shared cross-societal perception that the dobrobaty – the abbreviation for dobrovolchii batal’ony (volunteer battalions) – saved Ukraine as a state in mid2014. This real or presumed savior-role of the IAGs, in 2014, elicited then and has since continued to elicit considerable social popularity, public trust and political support for the initially non-state fighters, in particular, as well as for all soldiers employed within Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), in general. This was so much so that the majority of competitive parties actively induced former or still active combatants to join their electoral lists for the October 2014 parliamentary and October 2015 local elections. For instance, according to a study by the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, support from and for ATO fighters was one of the most important topics in the electoral campaigns of the parties for the 2015 local elections16.

Right-Wing Parties and their Para-Military Arms Although they continue to form a family of relatively minor Ukrainian political groupings18, such parties as the Right Sector, Svoboda (Freedom) party and National Corps as well as their involvement in the fighting in the Donbas are worth considering here first and foremost19. This is because the organisational connection between them and some new IAGs, as briefly sketch out below, was and partly still is particularly close. The Right Sector claims to have lost about 60–70 members in combat20, Svoboda over 50 members21, and the Azov Battalion/Regiment 39 members22. Another reason for considering the far-right here at the beginning is that these Ukrainian parties as well as their armed wings were and still are playing a disproportionately large role in the Kremlin’s propaganda campaign against, as well as, to a lesser degree, in Western media reports about, Ukraine.

Finally, it is not inconceivable that this, by mid-2018, still marginal family of parties can, in the future, gain more influence on Ukrainian national-level politics and then warrant more scholarly attention than hitherto. In March 2017, Svoboda, the Right Sector and National Corps signed a joint “National Manifesto”. According to Svoboda leader Oleh Tiahnybok, the parties “will not just coordinate their efforts, they will reach their goals together”23. As a united force, they could shape an entire new camp in Ukrainian politics, after the forthcoming autumn 2019 parliamentary elections. In such a case, the particularly close connections between the far-right and some of the below introduced current and former Ukrainian IAGs would also increase in relevance. [...] Our above survey indicates, to be sure, that many of the armed volunteer movement’s graduates did not hide their political ambitions, made political careers, and have come to influence Ukrainian political affairs, in one or another way. Yet, the IAGs or their successor volunteer units within the regular forces did not seem to have shaped, to a notable degree, Kyiv’s domestic policies, the Ukrainian polity and national-level politics of post-Euromaidan Ukraine, with the exception of decisions taken in relation to the conflict with Russia. Neither in the period of 2014–2015, when the IAGs had been more or less independent, nor afterwards, when most of them were integrated into the troops of the Ministries of Interior or Defense, did the volunteer units as such exert a clearly identifiable and relevant impact on the President’s, government’s or parliament’s decision-making, with regard to – narrowly defined – domestic political matters. [...] The shortlived Ukrainian armed volunteer movement and its interactions with electoral politics, in some regards, did and, in other regards, did not fit patterns observed in previous case studies and cross-cultural research of IAGs. The distinctly short life of the Ukrainian IAGs as more or less independent actors, and the swift integration of most of them into Ukraine’s regular forces, was unusual. This was one of the reasons for the relatively low political impact of the IAGs as such – a repercussion somewhat in contrast to the impressive political careers of some IAG commanders since 2014. [...] Many of the armed volunteer movement’s graduates did not hide their political ambitions, made political careers, and came to influence Ukrainian political affairs in one or another way. Yet, the IAGs or their successor volunteer units within the regular forces did not seem to have shaped, to a notable degree, Kyiv’s domestic policies, the Ukrainian polity and national-level politics of post-Euromaidan Ukraine, with the exception of decisions taken in relation to the conflict with Russia. Neither in the period 2014–2015, when the IAGs had been more or less independent, nor afterwards, when most of them were integrated into the troops of the Ministries of Interior or Defense, did the volunteer units as such exert a clearly identifiable and relevant impact on the President’s, government’s or parliament’s decision-making with regard to – narrowly defined – domestic political matters. Our paper indicates that one of the reasons that this did not happen may have been that the politicians who came out and were linked to the IAGs acquired, as MPs on various levels or executive officials with different functions, new opportunities to exert political impact. To be sure, the mere existence of IAGs may have, as a background condition, had some repercussions for these new politicians’ social standing, and for the public conduct of the President, government, parliament and parties. Yet, there has, so far, never been a situation in which a direct threat of a military or para-military group to use its arms, determined an, in the narrow sense, major domestic decision, i.e. principally shaped a course of action, appointment of personnel, or choice between alternative options not directly related to the war with Russia – the latter being a matter where, of course, the IAGs and their regular successor units exerted considerable influence. »

« Our above survey indicates considerable interpenetration between political parties and IAGs in Kyiv since 2014. Nevertheless, Huseyn Aliev’s recent assertion that the post-Euromaidan volunteer troops are “informal power-holders” in Ukraine is fundamentally misleading, and has no empirical grounding. The power of certain figures once or still linked to the IAGs and their successor units in Ukraine’s regular armed forces is due to the political posts that they occupy. It has little or nothing to do with their potential access to firearms and heavy weapons, or to their links to serving soldiers who could use such weaponry within the context of domestic politics213.

One of the structural reasons for the, at least until 2019, relatively low internal political salience of the Ukrainian IAGs regarding issues other than the Donbas conflict itself, as well as for the largely smooth transition of its former commanders to civilian politics, is the putatively civil character of the war in Eastern Ukraine214. Unlike numerous other paramilitaries around the world over the last few decades, the Ukrainian IAGs emerged within the context of a proxy and hybrid war between two already more or less established states: Russia and Ukraine. Contrary to the assertion of some observers215, the war in the Donbas was not primarily the result of an internal political rift within one and the same state216. The outbreak of the war was, to be sure, shaped by a number of Ukrainian domestic conditions that eased the Kremlin’s active meddling in the Donbas more so than in other regions where such attempts – as the so-called Glazyev Tapes documented217 – were also made218. Yet, the war in the Donets Basin would not have broken out in 2014 without the Russian factor219. »

« far-right organizations maintain a presence on the landscape of Ukraine's extra-parliamentary party politics, its NGO sector, its cultural life, local affairs, and (in some cases) foreign relations. Since Svoboda had cut most of its ties to European far-right parties by 2014, the latter refers primarily to the international connections of the Azov movement and other, smaller far-right groups. »

À partir de là, on ne parle que d'Azov:

« Yet, Azov’s transformation into a larger venture combining an armed regiment with a political party and supposedly non-political self-help movement raises concerns. It may mean that the Azov phenomenon will eventually have to be re-evaluated within the framework of uncivil movement as well as right-wing extremism studies, and the peculiar threats that groups falling under these headings pose for the consolidation and development of democracy. »

« Why did you decide to dedicate the book to Azov specifically, even though there are many other neo-Nazi organizations in the country?

Back in 2018, it became clear that this is the biggest and most powerful far-right movement which makes all the others look insignificant. I was stunned by the scale of Azov, which managed to build an entire infrastructure that includes the National Corps political party, the National Militia, and many other smaller organizations. I find it equally fascinating and concerning.

After the 2019 election, it became clear to me that Azov had taken the dominant position in the far-right movement. Ukraine has very few groups which try to go their own way, but even they need to coordinate their actions with Azov. Even fewer of them are in conflict with Azov. I would say that Azov has almost completely taken over the far right in Ukraine and established a monopoly. »

« In the latest parliamentary election, the united nationalist bloc, which included the Freedom Party and the National Corps, got 2.15%. How do you explain the electoral weakness of right-wing forces in Ukraine? Does this result mean that they have no impact on the country’s politics?

They have an impact on politics in Ukraine even though they achieved nothing in the election. Azov and the far right change the discourse in the country using non-parliamentary methods, for instance, by controlling the Veteran Ministry, the municipal guard via C14, or through national-patriotic education. I think that these two percent in the election don’t mean anything, I generally don’t believe that radical nationalists will ever win more votes in Ukrainian elections. The only way for the radical right to gain more votes in elections is to become more moderate. The National Corps is doing it right now, while remaining a far-right party at its core. I don’t think Ukrainians will buy it. In addition, many parties have employed nationalist rhetoric since 2014. The best example is Poroshenko’s 2019 campaign.

There are a lot of young people at National Corps demonstrations. Sometimes they are just children. How do they manage to involve them in the organization?

Azov leaders are very smart and resourceful. They try to present Azov as something masculine and very cool. As a place where you can train and become a stereotypical cool guy: muscles, tattoos, guns. I think that young Ukrainians, especially from small towns, are attracted by this. »

« The Azov Battalion developed extensive recruiting tactics within Ukraine, including for youth, establishing a fight club in Kiev as well as “youth camps, recreation centers, lecture halls and indoctrination programs” that teach children as young as 9 years old “military tactics and white supremacist ideology.” »

« Mais si certaines données semblent indiquer que l’Ukraine entend les requêtes qui lui sont faites de stopper l’arrivée de combattants étrangers (le pays a renvoyé deux citoyens des États-Unis, membres du groupe néo-nazi Atomwaffen Division, qui voulaient combattre aux côtés du Régiment Azov, d’après une publication du média BuzzFeed News), rien ne laisse présager d’une disparition prochaine du groupe Azov, qui bénéficie par ailleurs d’un fort soutien politique. « Il me semble clair qu’il faudra faire avec eux à l’avenir, parce qu’ils ont su s’ancrer et tisser les liens qu’il fallait avec l’État ukrainien, » pose Blazakis. « Et cela est très dangereux. » »

« Azov's influence in Ukraine's armed forces extends beyond the Regiment. The Centuria 'order' -- not to be confused with the National Militia descendant of the same name -- is an explicitly farright grouping of serving members in Ukraine's ... »

« Inside the Extremist Group That Dreams of Ruling Ukraine

The Azov movement insists it is not neo-Nazi, yet its members have been captured giving Hitler salutes and being virulently anti-Semitic. A trip to the group’s social center in Kiev reveals its heart of darkness »

« Furthermore, interviews with members of the Battalion openly espouse neo-Nazi and white supremacist views. Many fighters hold an aspirational belief of marching on Kyiv once the war is over, and that Ukraine “needs a strong dictator to come to power who could shed plenty of blood but unite the nation in the process.”[17] »

Militarisation et radicalisation de la société Ukrainienne

Du fait des conflits militaires, la société Ukrainienne se militarise, et les moeurs se radicalisent. Azov fait partie des figures de proues pour prodiguer ces enseignements, avec les subsides de l'État, puisqu'ayant une expérience irremplaçable grâce à ses vétérans, mais cette éducation militaire n'est pas nouvelle et prédate Azov.

« In late August 2018, the Ministry of Questions of the Temporary Occupied Territories released a report on the monitoring of public attitudes. The report documents a rapid increase in the number of acts of violence, vandalism, interethnic and interreligious provocations, unlawful use of weapons, as well as “manipulation of historical facts.” Simultaneously with the conditions of instability, the report documents increased frequency of “unlawful production and distribution of illegal weapons and explosives among civil population, as well as acts of violence employing these weapons” (Kabinet Ministriv Ukrainy 2018b). Examples of organized civil violence quoted in the report testify that the instances of violence are not limited to the zone of the military conflict, and “occur” in the majority of oblasts of Ukraine.8 The report documents the escalation of violence and radicalization of Ukrainian society that has spread to all of its borders, but does not further clarify the nature of the radicalized activities. One of the most publicly debated instances of violence was an attack on a Roma camp in the suburbs of Lviv in June of 2018, which resulted in loss of life, and which was conducted by perpetrators born between 2000 and 2002. In the press, this tragedy was reported as not an isolated incident, but one of many also occurring in other parts of Ukraine (Hromadsky Prostir 2018). According to a 2015 survey, youth is not an exemption when it comes to intolerance: “54 per cent of Ukrainian youth are intolerant of the Roma community, whilst 45 and 33 percent respectively would not like to live in the same district as homosexual or people with HIVAIDS (the country has one of the highest incidences of HIV in Europe)” (Mangas 2016). Recent radicalization within the Ukrainian society specifically in regards to ethnic and other visible minorities has been noticed on both left and right of the political spectrum, and connected to a lack of means for self-fulfillment (Hromadsky Prostir 2018).

Militarization of Ukrainian society has been also discussed by historian Olesya Khromeychuk (2018). Relying on Enloe (2000), she unpacks the term “militarization of society” and explains how, under certain circumstances, which include an armed conflict, the mood of militarization in a given society starts to expand beyond the front lines, and populates other forms of social relations, such as policy, cultural norms, and their artistic expressions. Khromeychuk observes a perpetuating tendency within the contemporary Ukrainian society to derive the meaning and structure of its social relations from the military confrontation in both present and past. She observes prestige associated with heroic efforts in the fight for the Motherland that populates contemporary Ukrainian media, as well as pointing out the many inequalities that a militarized society produces, such as the discrepancies in gender roles prescribed by the war that defines manhood and soldiering as “the ultimate expression of masculinity” and other illusions embedded in a symbolic structure of a militarized society (Khromeychuk 2018). The Strategy is an example of such tendencies  »

« Street-level white supremacy extremist groups have proliferated following the Euromaidan protests of 2014 and subsequent armed conflicts in Crimea and the Donbass, in eastern Ukraine. The most well-publicized of these groups are associated with the Azov Battalion. 145 While the international white supremacy extremism sympathies of the paramilitary arm have 146 been well documented, veterans of the movement have formed several more informal street organizations. (The paramilitary has now formally been incorporated into the Ukrainian 147 military, at least in theory.) These street-level organizations, such as the National Corps (or National Militia), have been implicated in brutal attacks on ethnic Roma encampments— pogroms justified by their ultranationalist, exclusionary rhetoric and stated goal of “cleaning the streets.”148 Other movements unaffiliated with Azov, such as the neo-Nazi group Combat 18, have received the official imprimatur of government officials for their “street patrols.” The 149 proliferation of paramilitary groups in Ukraine has likely been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, which has both drawn foreign fighters and undergirded the rise of exclusionary ultranationalism.150 »

« Yet there are at least four features of -- and developments in -- Ukraine's post-Euromaidan ultra-nationalist milieu that give reason for pause. First, as a result of Russia's war against Ukraine, there is growing public tolerance for radical nationalist organizations, actions, and individuals. Second, since 2014, certain far right organizations have received permanent access to guns and even heavy weapons by founding volunteer units. Some still control minor irregular armed groups, such as Right Sector's Volunteer Ukrainian Corps and the Statesman's Initiative's Ukrainian Volunteer Army -- although the terms "corps" and "army" are hyperbolic for these marginal para-military units. Third, far-right organizations maintain a presence on the landscape of Ukraine's extra-parliamentary party politics, its NGO sector, its cultural life, local affairs, and (in some cases) foreign relations. Since Svoboda had cut most of its ties to European far-right parties by 2014, the latter refers primarily to the international connections of the Azov movement and other, smaller far-right groups. Fourth, as a result of Ukrainian society's increased permissiveness vis-à-vis the far right, there have been repeated incidents of cooperation between certain governmental institutions -- such as the Security Service or Veterans oMinistry of Ukraine -- and parts of the far right. Overall, the continued electoral frailty of far-right parties and their correspondingly low influence on policymaking in Kyiv make Ukraine a positive exception to the European trend of increasingly powerful far-right parties. Yet since the Revolution of Dignity, uncivil society has become increasingly prevalent in Ukrainian communal, associational, and cultural life, while the differentiation of the nationalist organizational and intellectual spectrums has continued. This, combined with growing public respect for historical Ukrainian ultra-nationalism -- in particular the Bandera faction of the Second World War-era Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists -- has given Ukrainian public affairs distinct new characteristics. These and other politically disruptive tendencies are closely connected to, if not largely a result of, Russian's ongoing hybrid war against Ukraine since 2014. They constitute domestically divisive, internationally problematic, and potentially destabilizing features of post-Euromaidan Ukraine. »

« The active participation of many far-right activists as volunteer fighters against Russia-led forces in Eastern Ukraine has reduced their isolation, stigmatization, and rejection in mainstream Ukrainian society, including Ukraine's political and cultural establishment. To be sure, segments of Ukraine's political elite were willing to cooperate with the far right even before 2014, as evidence by the collaborations of moderate and radical nationalists in the 7th Verkhovna Rada, during the Revolution of Dignity, and in the post-Euromaidan interim government. Yet these alliances were situational and strategic rather than permanent and ideational. The longer Ukraine's armed conflict with Russia goes on, the easier it becomes for even fringe groups -- like the notorious neo-Nazi S14 (or C14) -- to integrate into Ukrainian society and public affairs. Not only politically and socially, but also culturally and mentally, the distance between mainstream and extreme politics, civil and uncivil society, moderate patriotic and ultra-nationalist groups, is shrinking. In light of daily reports from the front lines and weekly tallies of war victims, Ukrainian official political rhetoric, mass media discourse, cultural policies and memory affairs have become more militant and nationalistic. As a result, far-right ideas, leaders and organizations that were previously marginalized have become tolerated, if not liked, by society In Western democracies, the main political divide line today is between advocates and opponents of cultural and social liberalism. In Ukraine, by contrast, the main political questions center around an individual's or group's attitudes toward Ukraine's national independence, war with Russia, and the corrupt oligarchic system, as well as they foreign orientation -- with this last being understood as a geopolitical direction rather than a normative affinity. Insofar as ultranationalists and ethnocentrists answers are similar to those of Ukrainian liberals and conservatives, the former groups are becoming, with every passing year of war, more accepted by the latter. In spite of the ultra-nationalists' weakness in national polls, close monitoring and partial containment of far-right activities remain on the agenda for non-governmental watchdogs and governmental law-enforcement agencies. Despite being electorally impotent, Ukraine's far-right activist community has remained numerically, organizationally, and tactically potent since the Euromaidan and is still present on Ukraine's streets. Largely excluded from national politics, many ultra-nationalists have taken up projects within Ukrainian "uncivil society," in fields ranging from memory affairs and anti-LGBT activism to urgent ecological issues and animal protection. Far-right groups have even managed to garner governmental support for certain sucerity, veterans, and education programs. »

« Des membres du groupe ont perpétré une série d’attaques violentes à l’encontre de minorités, dont des Roms et des personnes LGBTQ, au cours des dernières années, ce qui a conduit le ministère américain des Affaires étrangères à cataloguer Azov parmi les « groupes nationalistes haineux ». »

« A 2018 US State Department report found that the movement's militia "attacked and destroyed a Romani camp in Kyiv after its residents failed to respond to their ultimatum to leave the area within 24 hours," in full view of the local police. »

Pour ne pas trop surcharger cette discussion, je n'irai pas trop en en détail là sur le sujet de l'éducation militaire des enfants, mais pour résumer très rapidement sur le sujet de l'indoctrination militaire des enfants, cela existe des deux côtés (Ukraine et Russie) depuis bien avant et l'origine peut être retracée aux programmes militaro-patriotiques de l'URSS, notamment les athlètes qui étaient aussi systématiquement des réservistes de l'armée. Cela s'est empiré à partir du conflit russo-ukrainien de 2014, les séparatistes ET les ukrainiens (en premier lieu Azov) montant sur pied des "youth summer camps" pour les entrainer militairement et les indoctriner (y compris à « tuer l'ennemi »). L'Ukraine a institutionalisé cette pratique en 2019 avec une stratégie nationale sur l'Éducation militaro-patriotique, qui met à jour les anciennes stratégies (en mettant davantage l'accent sur la formation militaire et revalorisation des combattants -- collaborateurs nazis -- de l'OUN et moins sur les droits humains), et avec un programme monétaire pour financer ces initatives des acteurs non étatiques, dont Azov a bénéficié. Le fait que l'État délègue cette tâche est d'une part car ces acteurs non étatiques sont plus indiqués, vu qu'ils ont de nombreux vétérans, mais également car si l'État ukrainien le faisait elle-même, cela contreviendrait aux conventions internationales interdisant l'indoctrination militaire des enfants et la charte de l'UNESCO sur les droits des enfants (contre les enfants soldats). La plupart des enfants qui sont enrôlés dans ces camps ne sont étonnamment pas ceux qui sont les plus proches des conflits, mais plutôt les enfants plus favorisés de familles qui peuvent se permettre de payer les frais, loin des lignes de front, avec à la clé un statut social plus envieur pour les enfants qui "font leur service" comparé à ceux qui ne le font pas. Néanmoins, il ne faut pas voir tout cela sous un oeil occidental, avec des préconceptions manichéenne sur les enfants et l'enfance, qui sont bien loin des réalités des zones en conflits de guerre. Tout cela est très bien décrit dans les sources, sujet extrêmement intéressant. (Il y a aussi ce passage étrange à peut-être creuser: « the mass mobilization of self-organized militias—including children—from across the country ».)

Quelques citations pour creuser le sujet provenant de ces deux sources (il y en a bien plus dans mes notes):

« Militarization is a multifaceted process through which militarism—i.e., the reproduction of war or readiness to fight and protect one’s homeland— through nurture, education, and media discourse becomes grounded in the deepest social layers (McSorley 2013: 234). States have always relied on the militarization of public life, including the sphere of education and nurture, to indoctrinate local populations. One of the key strategies adopted by countries engaged in armed conflict is the glorification of war and the patriotic education of children. This education envisages not only verbal indoctrination but also practical preparation to protect oneself and one’s homeland and to kill the enemy. The militarization of childhood in Eastern Europe, which our chapter addresses, results from the militarization of adults who then transfer it to children, as in many cases their emotional focus on the past1 (revolutions, uprisings, wars, cleansings, displacement, repression, starvation, communism—still alive in familial memory as well as in historical-patriotic memory) is more important to them than the future of their children. »

« there were 27 such camps operating in Ukraine, four of which were based in the non-government-controlled territory; together, they were serving roughly 730 children within the government-controlled territories and approximately 415 children in the non-government-controlled territories (Burov et al. 2016). Examples of the training provided to children and youth at the military-patriotic camps (e.g. assembly and disassembly of machine gun), firearms training (eg.g pneumatic and low caliber gun shooting, and occasionally shooting military weapons, such as AK and AVD), and physical training (e.g. hand-to-hand combat or obstacle courses). The report concludes that the development and implementation of a military-patriotic education has been identical in the east of the country, controlled by the rebels, and the rest of government-controlled Ukraine. Since 2016, the number of military-patriotic camps and children's involvement in them has only grown. »

« In response to the negative publicity, Ukrainian journalists conducted their own investigation into the camps, reporting that they accept children 7-18, and that the demobilized participants of the war whose real names are unknown train children, though every person is assigned a nickname. In one report, an organizer of a military-patriotic competition is introduced by his name, as an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" Zone veteran with three years of experience in intelligence, who said that "his work with children was a form of post-war rehabilitation" (Sanduliak 2018). Not all of the camps are government-operated. In fact, the majority are private. »

« However, and as indicated in the Strategy, they are mostly funded by the Ministries. The Ukrainian journalist’s investigation references the warning issued by the Coalition of Human Rights Organizations that “building within the organization of the relations, which fully copy statutory military relations (vertical hierarchical subordination, ranks, discipline, system of rewards and punishment, etc.) increases the risk of recruitment and use of children in illegal militarized formations.” Several Ukrainian legal experts and parents interviewed as a follow-up spoke in favour of military training and reminded the viewer that Ukraine was at war. Based on the legal opinion sought, the journalist concludes that “if the camps were the state camp, it could have been possible to talk about violation of the European Human Rights Convention, but because the camps are organized by the non-governmental organization, we cannot point out any such violations” (Sanduliak 2018). She then concludes that responsibility for the decision, as well as for fees, in this case rests with the parents. Although a couple of children interviewed in this brief report do not reflect the fuller spectrum of political subjecthood of Ukrainian children and youth, they do demonstrate how capable these young people are of assigning meaning to the event. [...] This journalistic investigation reveals an evident disconnect between the political bodies of children actually affected by the war and those who participate in the military-patriotic camps, at least within the governmentcontrolled territories of Ukraine. Whilst the actually displaced children as well as those who continue living on the front line are still affected by an acute crisis of displacement and deficit of even basic survival means, such as water, food, and shelter, a different group of children, largely better socially equipped through access to families, educational institutions, and often enough financial stability to cover the cost of camps, become actual participants of the military-patriotic education. Although all young citizens are equally involved in the process of making and re-making the Ukrainian state, their contribution is contested by a kind of “moral militarism” (Lee-Koo 2011) where certain moral superiority is attributed to the children who actively participate in the state-mandated networks of military training. [...] The design of the proposed network of the military-patriotic training, including the summer camps, although recent, resembles the system of a very similar kind, which used to be embedded in the educational curricula and which targeted primarily children and youth in the Soviet Union, of which some regions of Ukraine were a part for almost seventy years. Drawing on, among others, the work of Olga Kucherenko, Natalia Krestovska (2018) draws some similarities between the military-patriotic training for children that also exists in the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Luhansk and Donetsk and the Soviet tradition of education, which incorporated military training and obligatory instruction in “Civic Defense.” “Children’s participation in combat and guerrilla warfare…was included in Soviet propaganda, promoting a kind of cult around ‘pioneer heroes’,” recounts Krestovska (2018: 264). What Krestovska fails to observe is that the Ukrainian model of its military-patriotic education also contains a reference to the persistent legacy of the Soviet heritage in the Ukrainian government, its policy, and worldview. Upon a close examination, the new Strategy and the Soviet “Labour and Defense Ready” doctrine have much in common. “Labour and Defense Ready” (GTO) was initially a sporting movement, founded in 1930, but soon became increasingly more militaristic despite its declared intent to “overcome the empire-totalitarian rudiments in collective consciousness” (Prezydent Ukrainy: Chap. 2). As Kucherenko (2011: 88) notes in her book Little Soldiers, in the official Soviet discourse, athletes constituted the reserve of the army. Kucherenko further historicized the movement by tracing its implementation in educational curriculum. [...] Put in the context of the armed conflict and humanitarian and economic crises, Ukraine’s military-patriotic education of children and youth generates a spectrum of responses. Some of them, including the state’s position, are encouraging of such education and its growing value, whereas others call for the re-examination of Ukraine’s understanding of children’s rights. What is evident is that promotion of military training and encouragement of children and youth to take on an active role in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial unity is actively and routinely extended to children in all of Ukraine and is implemented through a network of state and non-government educational institutions and governed by social and educational policy, such as the Strategy of National-Patriotic Education in both its 2015 and 2019 renditions. Despite some positive achievements, such as promotion of cultural literacy, support for national media production, as well as the need for systemic infrastructural support for existent and emerging youth organizations of various kinds, many aspects of the most recent edition of the Strategy remain concerning. It is concerning not only because it extends the obligation of territorial defense of the state to its youngest citizens, and mandates it as a requirement of citizenship, but also because it promotes no diversity in the expression of patriotism and civic identity. Furthermore, the version of patriotism the Strategy promotes is not new, but instead is full of remnants of the Soviet patriotism doctrine with its hegemonic masculinity, selective historical memory, and promotion of territorial unity above the value of human life.9 Disconcertingly, and unlike the earlier 2015 version of the Strategy, the most recent version of no longer mentions respect for human rights, superiority of law, tolerance toward others, and equality of all before the law as desirable features of the “new Ukrainian” (Prezydent Ukrainy 2019: preamble). What is new, however, is the state’s attempt to re-inscribe children as defenders in the political order of the country by appealing to what Agamben calls the state of exception, an opportunity of re-fashioning the state’s policy towards maximization of the value of militarism. By targeting young people, the Strategy, and ultimately, the government, appeals to the potential of a growing population—a classic developmentalist trope—to be redeemed in service to the country. By passing this legislation whilst the country is at war, and as it has yet to deal with polarization of its society, the government also puts children from the non-government-controlled territories in a condition of an unfair competition, where now and in the future, the value of their Ukrainian citizenship and validation of their experience and expressions of patriotism will have to be contested. »

« The media and human rights activists report that thousands of children in Donbas and the Crimea have undergone military training or have been engaged in other initiatives connected with military activity and recruited in non-state armed formations. These practices are present on both sides of the conflict and are reported to have intensified. Despite being organized by both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups, military camps on the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (that have illegally proclaimed independence from Ukraine) are more common and established on the incentive of the local authorities. While the establishment of military camps for adolescents is not a breach of international law, the practices that raise particular concerns include training children in military strategies, camouflage, and handling explosive devices as is reported by some sources (Burov et al. 2016: 3).

Each armed conflict inhibits, prevents, and paralyzes upbringing, teaching, and learning. The fight between pro-Kremlin separatists and pro-Ukrainian state forces taking place since 2014 has exacerbated nationalist sentiments and brought chaos to the system of education, curricula, and among students. In the absence of peace and stability, when educational institutions are unable to fulfil their designated roles, curricula in war zones are become political tools. These practices in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine were described and visually presented by the photographer Diego Ibarra Sánchez in 2018–2019. He documented, inter alia, patriotic youth organizations actively training children how to fight, survive the war, use weapons, ‘hate the other,’ and how to defend oneself and one’s country against the neighbour-aggressor. In his summer diary, he mentions that “hundreds of children play war games while they are getting trained in military disciplines and firing tactics. … Time for playing with toys is gone. Childhood in Ukraine and Donetsk is being eroded by the conflict and it has turned in another way to spread propaganda” (Sánchez 2018). »

« Another element of militarization involves the preparation to react in the situation of armed mobilization implemented through militarypatriotic camps and recruitment to the so-called ‘Youth Army’ (Yunarmia). According to Halya Coynash (2019: 12), “Russia’s Defense Ministry is trying to get one million children and young people into this ‘army’ and it is likely that very many schools in occupied Crimea have their own units. In later October, it was reported that Russia had recruited 1500 children and young people from Sevastopol into Yunarmia.” Moreover, “This ‘youth army’ is the militaristic wing of the Russian Movement of School Students.” created by presidential decree in October 2015 and aimed at instilling “the system of values inherent to Russian society.” The Youth Army is supposed to be “responsible for issues linked with the military-patriotic upbringing of young people” (Coynash 2019: 12). Shooting courses dubbed “Colorful childhood” for secondary school children serve as another illustration. The courses are organized by a paramilitary formation, “The Republic of Donetsk.” Among activities conducted with the students on military training ranges are shooting training using automatic weapons such as machine guns and building general firearms skills. The strategy of the national-patriotic education of children and youth has existed since Ukraine gained independence and has been updated the new generation of Ukrainian children. By decree of the President of Ukraine on “The Strategy of National Patriotic Education” (Prezydent Ukrainy 2019) as well as the letter of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine “On National Patriotic Education” (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2019), recommend that schools and universities provide a more effective patriotic education for children and adolescents. This can be done, for example, through meetings with ex-political prisoners, including soldiers and sailors, and other veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war. National-patriotic education for children and adolescents is defined as the “…formation of patriotism and love for the motherland, spirituality, morality, respect for the national Ukrainian heritage, imitating the best examples of courage and valor of fighters for the freedom and independence of Ukraine and the definition of effective mechanisms of systemic interaction of government and civil society institutes on issues of national and patriotic education” (Press Service of the President of Ukraine 2015). The aim of the implementation of national-patriotic education is “… to contribute to a major national revival and protection of democratic European vector of Ukraine” (Press Service of the President of Ukraine 2015). A meeting held in 2018 in Kyiv between a ‘Hero of Ukraine’ and university students serves as an example of such national-patriotic education for the young (Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine 2018). This type of meeting is designed to instill in young people courage and heroism necessary for unconditional protection of their homeland. Under article 65 of the Constitution of Ukraine “Defence of the Motherland, of the independence and territorial indivisibility of Ukraine, and respect for its state symbols, are the duties of citizens of Ukraine. Citizens perform military service under the law” (Constitution of Ukraine 1996). According to Ukrainian Law “On Military Duty and Military Service,” the minimum age for military service in the country is 18 (Law of Ukraine 1992). However, since 2014, some adolescents, feeling the need to defend their motherland from Russian aggression, have joined the armed forces of Ukraine as soldier volunteers (Shevchenko 2014; Krestovska 2018), signing a contract with the Ukrainian Army despite being underage. Some of these underage volunteers were killed during hostilities. As Giovanna Barberis points out, it is unacceptable for armed forces to use underage recruits in combat (Barberis in Shevchenko 2014). The number of minors recruited and trained to fight on both sides of the barricades is unknown. Those who have died are regarded as heroes for the nation they represented. The “Book of Memory of fallen for Ukraine” shows that 31 adolescents under the age of 19 were killed during the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Memory Book 2019). The youngest of them was 16 (Memory Book 2019). In some cases, their contribution to the struggle was recognized in the form of posthumous orders. The war in the occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea has thus contributed to the phenomenon of the militarization of childhood. According to the data of portal Vchasno, “children in the occupied territories are extensively taught to fight and kill” (Vchasno 2019). Children as young as nine are reported to have been active members of rebel militias, an illustration of which is a story of a 9-year-old girl who was awarded several medals by the rebels in recognition of her active role in their group (News of Donbas 2016). The militarization of childhood during the period of the war and occupation in Ukraine is a highly damaging process, radically changing the lives and destinies of children in the occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea. [...] Conclusion: On the one hand, they fit into a destructive process of educating the young in societies affected by armed conflict; on the other hand, they are an inherent element of a survival strategy of countries based on transgressing borders.2 It is important to bear in mind the multidimensionality of childhood and the danger of “one, incomplete” story of childhood and war. »

Dans un camp d'entrainement Svoboda:

« The campers, some clad in combat fatigues, carefully aim their assault rifles. Their instructor offers advice: Don’t think of your target as a human being. So when these boys and girls shoot, they will shoot to kill. Most are in their teens, but some are as young as 8 years old. They are at a summer camp created by one of Ukraine’s radical nationalist groups, hidden in a forest in the west of the country, that was visited by The Associated Press. The camp has two purposes: to train children to defend their country from Russians and their sympathizers — and to spread nationalist ideology. “We never aim guns at people,” instructor Yuri “Chornota” Cherkashin tells them. “But we don’t count separatists, little green men, occupiers from Moscow, as people. So we can and should aim at them.” [...] Cherkashin is a veteran of the fight against pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine; he was wounded in combat and later came to lead Sokil, or Falcon, the youth wing of the Svoboda party. It is important, he says, to inculcate the nation’s youth with nationalist thought, so they can battle Vladimir Putin’s Russia as well as “challenges that could completely destroy” European civilization. Among those challenges: LGBT rights, which lecturers denounce as a sign of Western decadence. »

Voir aussi Colborne:

« One National Corps-branded affiliate is Youth Corps, a series of youth camps across Ukraine that have been held since 2015. Each 12-day camp session (Myachina, 2020) hosts approximately 90 children and youth, and involves many different activities that wouldn't be out of place at any other summer camp, like kayaking and obstacle courses. But Youth Corps camps also teach youth how to assemble and disassemble firearms; each day at the camp is begun with a group recitation of the Prayer of the Ukrainian Nationalist, an OUN-era paean to Ukraine with lines like "...let me find death in those deeds, a sweet death in agony for you." Youth Corps has received Ukrainian state funding for "National-patriotic education" to host some of these camps (Kuzmenko and Colborne, 2019). »

Quelle est l'influence internationale d'Azov?

Le mouvement Azov a une incroyable portée mondiale dans les réseaux néonazis en usant des réseaux sociaux très efficacement et vend même du merchandising, d'après les rapports de 2018 et 2020 du Center for Countering Digital Hate. Il recrute activement et entraine les néonazis du monde entier, en multipliant les groupes sur les réseaux sociaux comme Facebook ainsi que Telegram, avec une méthode de communication extrêmement efficace dans le monde entier, similaire aux groupes djihadistes tels que Al Qaeda et État Islamique. Plusieurs attaques terroristes dans le monde ont été reliés à la nouvelle émergence globaliste de l'extrême-droite, et en particulier à Azov (il avait un badge du régiment Azov et les avait visité), comme le tireur de Christchurch. Le Soufan Center qualifie Azov de « noeud critique dans le réseau d'extrême-droite violent transnational » et le Time Magazine de « hub of white nationalists » Mais Azov a également ses détracteurs, même dans la scène d'extrême-droite radicale mondiale. Olena Semenyaka, le Azov’s International Outreach Office, le projet Intermarium et le projet Reconquista (reconquête de l'Europe), qu'elle dirige tous trois, sont au cœur des objectifs de globalisation d'Azov dans la scène d'extrême-droite radicale dans le monde.

« Conducted together with online open-source investigators Bellingcat, my research into the National Corps has revealed a pattern of troubling international activity and ties to white supremacist groups. New revelations appear regularly. I recently learned that the National Corps apparently provided training in Odesa to a member of American neo-Nazi group “Rise Above Movement”. In 2019, the party invited German neo-Nazi party “Dritte Weg” (Third Way) to march alongside Ukrainian veterans in Kyiv. In an earlier interview with the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement, the party’s international secretary promised opportunities to train “in military tactics, shooting and more” in Ukraine. On the international stage, the party touts its ties to the Regiment in order to boost its legitimacy. »

-- De façon intéressante, "Third Way" est également le nom d'une idéologie que le mouvement Azov a conçu et qu'ils essayent de promouvoir, voir Nonjon (chercher "Troisième Voie").

« "Via Azov's political wing – the National Corps party; described by researchers as neo-Nazi," Kuzmenko added, "the movement has gone international on multiple fronts with known contacts in Germany's neo-Nazi Third Path (Der Dritte Weg) party, America's Rise Above Movement, Italy's Casa Pound, etc.; but also with less-scrutinized international contacts via other branches of the movement that draw less attention but may carry equally dangerous implications." »

« * The Azov Battalion is emerging as a critical node in the transnational right-wing violent extremist (RWE) movement.
* Recruits from the U.S., Norway, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Sweden, and Australia, among others, have reportedly traveled to train with the Azov Battalion.
* The global nature of these groups is just one of several similarities between RWEs and Salafi-jihadists.

[...]

The Azov Battalion is emerging as a critical node in the transnational right-wing violent extremist (RWE) network. This group maintains its own ‘Western Outreach Office' to help recruit and attract foreign fighters that travel to train and connect with people from like-minded violent organizations from across the globe. Operatives from the outreach office travel around Europe to promote the organization and proselytize its mission of white supremacy. In July 2018, German-language fliers were distributed among the visitors at a right-wing rock festival in Thuringia, inviting them to be part of the Azov battalion: ‘join the ranks of the best' to ‘save Europe from extinction.' It has also established youth camps, sporting recreation centers, lecture halls, and far-right education programs, including some that teach children as young as 9 years old military tactics and far-right ideology. This aggressive approach to networking serves one of the Azov Battalion’s overarching objectives to transform areas under its control in Ukraine into the primary hub for transnational white supremacy.

Too often, the focus on foreign fighters has been relegated to Sunni jihadists, but in a globalized world, the foreign fighter phenomenon has deep roots across ideologies, from foreign fighters assisting the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, to Shi'a militants traveling from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon to join with Iranian-backed foreign fighter networks operating in Syria. It is now evident that RWE networks are also highly active in recruiting fighters worldwide to its cause, with the Azov Battalion and other ultra-nationalist organizations playing a significant role in the globalization of RWE violence. Indeed, the Azov Battalion is forging links with RWE groups, hosting visits from ultra-nationalist organizations such as members of the Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.) from the U.S. and the British National Action from the U.K., among other white supremacists from around the world. In the United States, several R.A.M. members (all American citizens) who spent time in Ukraine training with the Azov Battalion were recently indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) for their role in violently attacking counter-protestors during the ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, VA in August 2017.  »

« In Ukraine, the Azov Battalion has recruited foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, including many from the West, to join its ranks and receive training, indoctrination, and instruction in irregular warfare. In late September, a U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Riley in Kansas was arrested after distributing information online about how to build a bomb and planning to travel to Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion. Members of the “western outreach office” travel around Europe to promote the organization and meet with like-minded individuals and groups. In addition, the group invited prominent white supremacy extremist ideologues to visit Ukraine.141 In October 2018 American Greg Johnson, a leading ideologist for the white nationalist movement, visited Ukraine and attended a series of events hosted by the National Corps In the summer of 2018, German-language flyers were distributed among audience members at a rock concert in Thuringia, inviting them to be part of the Azov Battalion: “join the ranks of the best” in order to “save Europe from extinction.”142 Similar efforts to infiltrate mainstream German society by softpedaling messages of racism and hatred are staged frequently. [...] The Azov Battalion has cultivated a relationship with members of the Atomwaffen Division as well as with U.S.-based militants from R.A.M., the Southern California–based organization that the FBI has labeled a “white supremacy extremist group.” The relationships between U.S.- based WSEs and the Azov Battalion go beyond mere networking and include training and radicalization of American extremists. The Azov Battalion also maintains a political wing and has ties to a growing vigilante street movement that can be counted on for violence, intimidation, and coercion. So far, nationals from Germany, the UK, Brazil, Sweden, the United States, and Australia have reportedly traveled to join the Azov Battalion in Ukraine. The group has also allegedly established youth camps, recreation centers, lecture halls, and indoctrination programs, including some that teach children as young as 9 years old military tactics and white supremacist ideology. »

« When they finally rendezvoused, Fuller noticed the swastika tattoo on the middle finger of Furholm’s left hand. It didn’t surprise him; the recruiter had made no secret of his neo-Nazi politics. Within the global network of far-right extremists, he served as a point of contact to the Azov movement, the Ukrainian militant group that has trained and inspired white supremacists from around the world [...] Outside Ukraine, Azov occupies a central role in a network of extremist groups stretching from California across Europe to New Zealand, according to law enforcement officials on three continents. And it acts as a magnet for young men eager for combat experience. Ali Soufan, a security consultant and former FBI agent who has studied Azov, estimates that more than 17,000 foreign fighters have come to Ukraine over the past six years from 50 countries.

The vast majority have no apparent links to far-right ideology. But as Soufan looked into the recruitment methods of Ukraine’s more radical militias, he found an alarming pattern. It reminded him of Afghanistan in the 1990s, after Soviet forces withdrew and the U.S. failed to fill the security vacuum. “Pretty soon the extremists took over. The Taliban was in charge. And we did not wake up until 9/11,” Soufan tells TIME. “This is the parallel now with Ukraine.”

At a hearing of the House Committee on Homeland Security in September 2019, Soufan urged lawmakers to take the threat more seriously. The following month, 40 members of Congress signed a letter calling—unsuccessfully—for the U.S. State Department to designate Azov a foreign terrorist organization. “Azov has been recruiting, radicalizing, and training American citizens for years,” the letter said. Christopher Wray, the director of the FBI, later confirmed in testimony to the U.S. Senate that American white supremacists are “actually traveling overseas to train.”

The hearings on Capitol Hill glossed over a crucial question: How did Azov, an obscure militia started in 2014 with only a few dozen members, become so influential in the global web of far-right extremism? TIME, in more than a dozen interviews with Azov’s leaders and recruits, found that the key to its international growth has been its pervasive use of social media, especially Facebook, which has struggled to keep the group off its platform. “Facebook is the main channel,” says Furholm, the recruiter. [...] After the worst such attack in recent years—the massacre of 51 people in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019—an arm of the Azov movement helped distribute the terrorist’s raving manifesto, in print and online, seeking to glorify his crimes and inspire others to follow. In the 16 years that followed the attacks of 9/11, far-right groups were responsible for nearly three-quarters of the 85 deadly extremist incidents that took place on American soil, according to a report published in 2017 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. In their letter to the State Department in 2019, U.S. lawmakers noted that “the link between Azov and acts of terror in America is clear.” The Ukrainian authorities have also taken notice. [...] It might seem ironic for this hub of white nationalists to be situated in Ukraine. At one point in 2019, it was the only nation in the world, apart from Israel, to have a Jewish President and a Jewish Prime Minister. Far-right politicians failed to win a single seat in parliament in the most recent elections. But in the context of the white-supremacist movement globally, Azov has no rivals on two important fronts: its access to weapons and its recruiting power. »

« The U.S. government was also slow to acknowledge the danger of Ukraine’s far-right militias. But by March 2018, the U.S. Congress publicly denounced the Azov Battalion, banning the U.S. government from providing any “arms, training or other assistance” to its fighters. Though largely symbolic, the move discouraged all Western military forces, and especially members of the NATO alliance, from training alongside Azov fighters— or indeed having anything to do with them. It was a deep blow to morale, especially in Azov’s military wing, says Svyatoslav Palamar, one of its top commanders. “Some people still see us as hooligans and outlaws,” he told TIME during a visit to Azov’s training base near Mariupol, where uniformed cadets had spent the day learning the proper way to hurl a grenade. “We’ve come a long way since the early days.” To prove it, Azov tightened its standards for foreign fighters, accepting only those with enough weapons training and expertise to serve as military instructors. But the shift did not obviate the need for Furholm’s brand of online recruitment. On the contrary, in the summer of 2018, Azov’s political wing allowed him to use one of its cottages outside Kyiv as a hostel for foreign fighters. Those who did not make the cut were channeled into one of Ukraine’s other militia groups, or in some cases, the regular Ukrainian military. »

« Ces gens sont venus en Ukraine pour différentes raisons. Certains venaient en quête d’aventures, de statuts ou de formation militaire. Mais tous sont rentrés chez eux avec une plus grande expérience du combat et des contacts à l’international, ce qui a conduit les experts à évoquer une menace extrémiste tout à fait inquiétante. Ainsi, estiment-ils, ce flot de combattants d’extrême droite a fait de l’Ukraine une plaque tournante pour les réseaux suprémacistes blancs, avec des relents fascistes sous-jacents qui continuent d’attirer et d’inspirer les extrémistes radicaux du monde entier.

Marilyn Mayo, chargée de recherches au Centre sur l’Extrémisme de l’Anti-Defamation League (ADL) dit : « Les suprémacistes blancs, ils meurent d’envie de se battre. Quand vous analysez l’idéologie de ces groupes, nombre d’entre eux disent qu’ils se préparent pour une guerre raciale, et ils veulent s’entraîner pour de vrai. »

Pour ces combattants étrangers, la guerre en Ukraine était une excellente opportunité de réaliser leur rêve, de fouler le champ de bataille, comme l’indique Jason Blazakis, chargé de recherches au Centre Soufan.

Blazakis explique que « les gens comme Skillt incarnent ce que bon nombre de suprémacistes blancs aimeraient être. Et beaucoup d’entre eux aimeraient aller sur le terrain, à la guerre… en Ukraine, pour vivre leur rêve à la première personne. »

Skillt avait déjà une certaine expérience militaire puisqu’il avait servi au sein de la garde nationale suédoise. En Ukraine, il a signé pour combattre dans l’une des milices de volontaires formées pour défendre l’Ukraine après le soulèvement séparatiste soutenu par la Russie à l’Est du pays, en 2014.

Cette milice, c’est le Régiment Azov, une puissante troupe d’extrême droite mue par les mêmes forces ultra-nationalistes qui avaient envoyé des hommes en première ligne de la révolution. [...] Azov a rapidement attiré l’attention, non seulement du fait de sa ligne politique d’extrême droite, mais aussi pour ses réussites sur le champ de bataille. Le régiment a acquis une importante renommée suite aux violents combats qui ont fait rage dans la ville de Marioupol, où Skillt était au cœur de l’action.

Malgré ses affiliations radicales, les actions du Régiment Azov lui ont permis de gagner une grande légitimité et de représenter, au niveau national, une entité reconnue comme défendant la nation. Cela a également eu pour effet d’accroître sa réputation parmi les partisans de l’extrême droite du monde entier, et le régiment a pu recruter activement à travers les réseaux sociaux et autres réseaux d’accointances.

« Ils ont prouvé qu’ils étaient une force à ne pas sous-estimer, » décrypte Blazakis, avant d’ajouter que le Régiment Azov fait désormais l’objet d’une espèce de culte parmi les partisans de l’extrême droite au niveau international. [...] L’écosystème du Régiment Azov a aussi permis d’alimenter une culture souterraine d’extrême droite relativement prospère en Ukraine. Les extrémistes liés à Azov organisent des festivals de musique ou des tournois de MMA néo-nazis ou lancent des marques de fringues dans la même veine, et le groupe continue de tisser ses réseaux et de trouver des soutiens au sein des mouvements radicaux d’extrême droite dans le monde entier.

Cela a notamment inspiré et attiré des fans venus des quatre coins de la planète, y compris des États-Unis.

Parmi les plus fervents admirateurs de Azov, on trouve Robert Rundo, fondateur du Rise Above Movement, RAM, un groupe de suprémacistes blancs des plus violents sévissant aux États-Unis. Rundo a effectué un pèlerinage en Ukraine en 2018 pour combattre dans les événements de MMA organisés par le Régiment Azov, et il a profité de l’occasion pour lancer un podcast en collaboration avec une personnalité importante affiliée au groupe ukrainien.

Rundo s’est exprimé très ouvertement sur le rôle du Régiment Azov qui a été une source d’inspiration pour sa propre idéologie politique, extrémiste, aux États-Unis. C’est en ces termes qu’il décrit la scène d’extrême droite ukrainienne dans l’un de ses podcasts en 2017 : « Ma seule et unique source d’inspiration, pour tout. »

L’influence de cette frange ultra-nationaliste ukrainienne a très vite suscité des inquiétudes au niveau mondial, notamment par rapport au fait qu’elle va aider à consolider et encourager des groupes nationalistes blancs au-delà des frontières de l’Ukraine.

Le gouvernement des États-Unis veille à ce qu’aucune des aides militaires fournies à l’Ukraine ne finissent dans les mains du Régiment Azov, et le FBI a déclaré, dans une plainte pénale, qu’il pense que Azov entraîne et radicalise des citoyens américains suprémacistes blancs. En 2019, les inquiétudes face aux risques que représentent les ultra-nationalistes ukrainiens ont poussé des ambassadeurs de pays du G7 à enjoindre le gouvernement ukrainien d’agir contre les extrémistes. »

« Denis Nikitin, a key figure in the Azov movement's outreach to right-wing extremists in the U.S. and Western Europe, at the Young Flame festival outside Kyiv, a major recruitment event he organized in August 2019. The event included mixed martial arts and endurance competitions, as well as a series of public lectures on the movement’s extreme right-wing ideology. »

« Azov is a dynamic uncivil movement that is actively advancing on different domestic fronts and strengthening its foreign contacts. It has become a visible part of the international groupuscular right, and maintains links to uncivil (mainly racist) organizations in the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation, among others. »

« far-right organizations maintain a presence on the landscape of Ukraine's extra-parliamentary party politics, its NGO sector, its cultural life, local affairs, and (in some cases) foreign relations. Since Svoboda had cut most of its ties to European far-right parties by 2014, the latter refers primarily to the international connections of the Azov movement and other, smaller far-right groups. »

« The Ukrainian radical right use Telegram for everything, from the National Corps’ official channel and the channel of its leader Andriy Biletsky, an enormous number of minor channels for various subgroups associated with Azov, and to the semi-secret chat rooms. All of this together is a huge array of data. I got literally obsessed with the far-right Telegram, but at least I had a chance to figure out how the whole communication works. The information published on the official channels of the National Corps, Biletsky or Maxim Zhorin, the head of the party’s headquarters, is a polished message for the outside world. But on the small channels and in the chat rooms, the radical right talk frankly and do not try to hide anything behind eloquent wording because they think that nobody is watching. A huge chunk of information for the book was taken from conversations between Azov members on Telegram. »

« Your book is titled From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right. The first part of the title is clear, it refers to the war of 2014, but please explain the second part for our readers. How does Azov relate to the global far-right movement?

Azov’s relationship with the global far-right movement has undoubtedly changed, and I’ve dedicated an entire chapter to it. It is easy to trace by following the actions of Olena Semeniaka, the National Corps secretary for international affairs. In 2017–2018, she traveled all over Europe and talked to the far right in Germany, Croatia, Portugal, Italy and other countries.

Everything changed in 2019, first of all due to the critical media coverage of Azov’s activities, including my publications. This ended their aggressive international information and propaganda work. They could not stand up to the criticism and lost ground. Publications about the training base for the far right in Ukraine and comparisons between Azov and ISIS attracted so much attention that Azov had to suspend its international programs, at least in the public field. Secondly, the attack on mosques on 15 March 2019 in Christchurch made people pay close attention to far-right terrorism. I’m curious what Azov is going to do with its international program. I don’t think they will abandon it entirely, maybe they will carry it out in secret or more selectively.

At the same time, many of the foreign far right still see Azov as the ideal model of a far-right movement. This perception is partly based on myth and partly on real facts. Even now, the Western far right, particularly the French and the Germans, write about Ukraine as a place where you can simply come, get a gun and go to the front right away. But it hasn’t worked like that for a few years now!

What does the far right success in Ukraine mean? Is it a global right-wing revanche?

I think it is. We’re observing the revival of far-right forces everywhere, it’s just that there are factors in Ukraine which made the situation significantly worse. In other countries I visited the far right are much less numerous, but even they have started acting openly and confidently.

[...]

There are far right in every country. And they are feeling more confident. I think that the reason for this global right-wing turn is that influential politicians are leaning to the right and even use a soft version of the far-right rhetoric. This has paved the way for the real far right: when politicians repeat their ridiculous ideas, it gives the far right confidence. When I look at the current American political situation and compare it to what they had before Trump, I see that the far right are acting even more openly. In countries such as the US, Canada and the UK, they have infiltrated the media and complain about the “culture war,” the onslaught of liberalism, wokeism and other nonsense. This polarization of the debate gives room for maneuver to the far right, who start seeing themselves as the avant-garde of the fight against the LGBTIQ+ and gender theory.

What can we call this? The return of the far right?

I would call it a global far-right revival which we can observe around the world, not just in Ukraine. I mean primarily the majority of European and North American countries. »

« "The Azov movement is a dangerous key player of the transnational extreme-right and has served as a network hub for several years now, with strong ties to far-right extremists in many European Union countries and the United States", Ritzmann said.

Olena Semenyaka, the head of the National Corps' international department, attended a festival in 2018 organized by German neo-Nazis; and in 2019 she spoke at the far-right Scanza Forum in Sweden alongside British neo-Nazi Mark Collett.

Since forming in 2014, the ​Azov movement has grown to include a militia, summer camps for kids and paramilitary training centers. It runs activities, including music festivals, political events and mixed-martial-arts tournaments, as it promoted itself in the international far-right space.

The National Corps has repeatedly demonstrated its disdain for liberal values in its treatment of minority groups -- with few repercussions. »

Le livre de Colborne va plus en profondeur, c'est le livre référence sur tout ce qui a à voir avec Azov, mais il n'existe pas en ligne, seuls quelques extraits sont accessibles publiquement, décrivant l'idéologie de la « Troisième Voie » comme Nonjon décrit également, une vision de conquête de l'Europe par l'unification paneuropéenne de l'extrême-droite, n'étant ni pro-Occidents ni pro-Russie mais souhaitant s'affranchir de tous (voir aussi Umland):

« In her capacity as head of the initiative at the National Corps central headquarters in Kyiv, Olena Semenyaka heads the Intermarium project. An early 20th century idea resurrected by the far right of an eastern European confederation of countries to counter both Russian influence and western influence, the project sees countries spanning from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic as a bloc of nations that, as Semenyaka has described, can act like a springboard for the revival of Europe; as per a slogan used at its international conferences since 2016, "the heart of Europe beats in the East." Under Semenyaka's direction, the project has hosted a number of international conferences with representatives of far-right movements, along with more mainstream right-wing figures in its most recent iteration in December 2020. I discuss the triumphs and troubles of the Intermarium initiative in more detail in Chapter 6.

Azov Regiment veteran and March of Defenders chief organizer Dmytro Shatrovskyi heads arguably one of the most important Azov affiliates: the Veterans Brotherhood. There are several hundred thousand veterans of the war across Ukraine, of whom only a small minority hold far-right views, have any connection to the far right or are willing to join a far-right movement. In spite of this, groups like Veterans Brotherhood have become "the most influential political actors in veteran organizing" (Friedrich and Lütkefend, 2021). Veterans Brotherhood has played a central role in the launch of Ukraine's veterans' ministry, building relationships with key government officials and positioning themselves as the main defenders of veterans' interests (Bellingcat Anti-Equality Monitoring, 2019). Veterans are, understandably, held in high regard in Ukraine; surveys over several years have suggested those who have fought in the still-hot war are among the most trusted people in Ukrainian society. Veterans Brotherhood and the broader umbrella movement it dominates, the Veterans Movement of Ukraine, takes full advantage of this. These efforts are a means for the far right to insulate their activities from criticism, working alongside non-far-right actors to slowly push itself more into mainstream of Ukrainian politics and society (Bellingcat Anti-Equality Monitoring, 2019). »

"Publishing houses also form part of the list of Azov affiliates" comme Plomin, "both a book club and publishing house", qui publie de nombreux ouvrages extrêmistes "less subtle and much more openly extreme", comme des ouvrages fascistes ("Corneliu Codreanu and his Iron Guard"), antisémites, et de terroristes (traduction d'unabomber manifesto avec des notes positives du traducteur, terroristes d'extrême droite italien Franco Freda, etc).

Pour avoir plus d'informations sur ce sujet, il faut creuser le "Intermarium project" du mouvement Azov:

« While the regiment still looks to Biletsky for inspiration, he has moved into politics; he served as a member of the Ukrainian parliament from 2014 to 2019 but lost reelection. He now heads the National Corps political party, which has been largely unsuccessful at getting members into elected positions but is using social media to try to grow support. He is also one of the founders of the movement’s Intermarium project, which builds bridges to white nationalists and neo-Nazis in Western Europe and the US. Although Facebook previously took down Intermarium pages, a new Intermarium page was created on Sept. 9. Run by the National Corps’ international secretary, Olena Semenyaka, it has been sharing news and information about far-right and neo-Nazi figures in Europe and promoting “cultural” events at its Kyiv office. After a ban, Semenyaka too has reopened Facebook and Instagram accounts under a pseudonym. »

L'enquête du Time Magazine a fait les mêmes observations concernant Olena Semenyaka et les ambitions d'Azov à l'international:

« “It could be described as a small state within a state,” says Olena Semenyaka, the head of international outreach for the Azov movement. On a tour of the Cossack House in 2019, she told TIME that Azov’s mission was to form a coalition of far-right groups across the Western world, with the ultimate aim of taking power throughout Europe. »

La description du Time d'un « État dans l'État » peut être mis en perspective avec les analyses du Soufan Center et du Center for Countering Digital Hate rapprochant les méthodes de communication d'Azov avec les groupes de djihad islamique:

« There are striking resemblances between the Azov Battalion’s Western Outreach Office and al-Qaeda’s Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which was responsible for promoting the cause and helping recruits reach the battlefield. Just as Afghanistan served as a sanctuary for jihadist organizations like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the 1980s, so too are parts of Ukraine becoming a safe haven for an array of white supremacy extremist groups to congregate, train, and radicalize. And just like the path of jihadist groups, the goal of many of these members is to return to their countries of origin (or third-party countries) to wreak havoc and use acts of violence as a means of recruiting new members to their cause. Unlike jihadis who are attempting to strike Western targets, though, radicalized white supremacists have the added advantage of being able to blend in seamlessly in the West, just as Brenton Tarrant was able to do. For Russian neo-Nazis, the International Russian Conservative Forum serves as the rallying point for white supremacy extremists from all over the globe to congregate and network.144 »

Évolution depuis le début de l'invasion de l'Ukraine:

« Warning of the risks of extremist mobilization among foreign fighters, terrorism analyst and founder of Search International Terrorist Entities Intelligence Group Rita Katz warned that we haven’t seen “such a flurry of recruitment activity” since ISIS. »

D'après des notes des renseignements, les volontaires français et belges en 2022 sont majoritairement de profil d'ultra-droite et « fascinés » par Azov, les renseignements français DGSI expliquant qu'« ils suscitent toute notre attention, compte tenu de l'engagement dans le conflit du bataillon Azov, qui semble exercer une certaine fascination sur une frange de l'ultradroite française ». C'est similaire à ce qu'il s'est passé en 2014 déjà: « From across Europe and the U.S., dozens of fighters came to join Azov that year, many of them bearing tattoos and rap sheets earned in the neo-Nazi underground back home. The Ukrainian authorities welcomed many of them, and in some cases granted them citizenship. Within the war’s first year, Biletsky’s militia was officially absorbed into the National Guard, becoming a regiment within Ukraine’s armed forces. »

Un article d'une autre ONG observant l'émergence des extrémismes détaille les origines idéologiques de cette nouvelle mouvance globaliste d'extrême-droite, avec encore une fois Azov au coeur des formations de groupes néonazis et de terroristes (je fais une citation mais tout le texte est à ce sujet):

« American white supremacists have traveled to Ukraine to train with the Azov Battalion, which was originally formed as a volunteer militia to fight Russian irregular forces working with eastern Ukrainian separatist forces starting in 2014, in particular with the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Foreign fighters have been drawn to both sides of the conflict in the Ukraine, but research suggests that right-wing extremists have been more likely to be involved on the side of Azov and other groups that worked to repel Russian involvement in the region.[28] There is a parallel here to the history of foreign fighters during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Americans, as well as Italians, Spaniards, Brits and French fighters joined Croatia’s Black Legion in 1991 and the majority of were linked to extreme-right organizations within their own countries.[29] American white supremacists have gained even greater exposure to the ideas of racial extremists from Southeast Europe through their involvement with Azov, as it has attracted white supremacist foreign fighters[34] from many countries including Greece and Croatia, with some 20 Croats joining the battalion in 2015.[35] Also, Azov moved to form a “foreign legion” of sorts under the leadership of a Croat living in Zagreb. [...] Azov successfully recruited well-known American white supremacists to train with the unit. »

Azov a fait un communiqué soutenant l'attaque du Capitol aux USA de 2021.

Pour avoir une idée des méthodes de communication qu'utilise Azov pour nouer des liens à l'international, non seulement il fait un usage intensif des réseaux sociaux comme les enquêtes du Soufan Center, Center For Countering Digital Hate et Time Magazine le décrivent, mais il organise aussi par exemple des tournois de combat MMA entre les soldats du régiment Azov et des membres du groupe néonazi américain Rise Above Movement (RAM):

« In April 2018, RAM founder Robert Rundo visited Kyiv and took part in an Azov-organized fight club. That October, the FBI wrote that it believed Azov was involved in “training and radicalizing United States-based white supremacy organizations.” »

Source originale: « Robert Rundo, the muscly leader of a California-based white-supremacist group that refers to itself as the "premier MMA (mixed martial arts) club of the Alt-Right," unleashed a barrage of punches against his opponent. »

« Whether Azov as a whole has been directly influenced by the Nouvelle Droite is debatable. However, as I make clear in Chapter 5 of this book, the concept of metapolitics, whether consciously or not, underpins much of how the Azov ... »

« E: The book maps out a broad ecosystem of the far-right landscape in Ukraine, not just the Azov movement. How do you think the far-right in Ukraine is being viewed by other far-right movements globally? Or is it more isolated than assumed?

M: This is a much tougher question than people might think! There’s generally a split on the global far right in terms of how the Azov movement is seen — and at its core it comes down to how they see not Ukraine, but Russia. Of course, on the one hand, Azov has its allies that it has tried to form networks with in the past — far-right allies see Azov as a movement they should aspire to be like, one that can push back not only the ‘neo-Bolshevism’ they see coming from Vladimir Putin’s Russia (a Russia that, they stress, is too diverse and thus in many ways ‘un-European’ [read: not ‘white’]) but against the perceived decadence and decay of the west. But Azov has its haters among the global far right — people who see it as a tool of western influence, people who see Russia as some proper bulwark of right-wing values and thus see Azov fighting wrongly against that. In the context of the current invasion, this kind of rhetoric has come out in some pretty ugly language; given that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is Jewish, Azov gets accused by some on the global far right as being part of all manner of antisemitic conspiracies. »

« E: What is the potential for growth of the far-right in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war? Do you think that it will remain regional or is there potential for it to become transnational?

M: Even in the context of the current invasion, I don’t see Azov showing the potential right now to become much more transnational than it already is. Sure, the movement has recruited several dozen foreign fighters — not all of whom could be defined as ‘far right,’ in my view — and has its support from allies across Europe. But for the most part the movement is concerned, understandably so, with what is happening at home. And whether it grows or not in the wake of this brutal, awful war remains to be seen. Ironically, I think the one person in the world most interested in seeing Azov grow because of the war is Vladimir Putin himself. »

« Since it formed, the Azov movement has recruited foreign fighters motivated by White supremacism to fight in Ukraine, experts say. Russia's full-scale invasion of the country, and Zelensky's call for foreign volunteers to join the fight, have raised concerns about radicalization in the war. "My concern is that people, especially far-right extremists in Europe, (will gain) combat experience and training in the Ukrainian theater and then use that for terrorist attacks in Europe proper," Colin P. Clarke, senior research fellow at the New York- based ​foreign policy research nonprofit the Soufan Center, told CNN. In 2020, Buzzfeed reported that Ukraine deported two members from the US-based neo-Nazi group the Atomwaffen Division, who were trying to gain combat experience with Azov. Rekawek, an expert on foreign fighters at C-REX, said Azov has only been able to recruit 20 foreign fighters since the start of the 2022 invasion. CNN has not been able to verify those figures independently. »

« Ukrainian Far-Right Fighters, White Supremacists Trained by Major European Security Firm

Since 2016, the European Security Academy (ESA) an EU-based company that offers advanced training programs for security, law enforcement and military professionals, has provided sophisticated training geared towards combat application to elements of Ukraine’s controversial Azov Regiment, also known as the Azov Battalion, which has been integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard in Mariupol. A large group from Ukraine consisting at least partially of Azov veterans, along with likely current members of Azov movement and other far-right activists, received special-ops like training in the ESA training center in Poland. Among recipients of ESA advanced firearms and tactics training are also current activists of far-right organizations in Ukraine linked to attacks on, or harassment of Ukrainian Roma, LGBT persons and rights activists: Tradition and Order, The National Corps and The National Militia. At least one individual who previously received sophisticated training from ESA recently provided firearms training to members of the Azov-linked “National Corps”, an ultra-nationalist organization in Ukraine recently linked to attacks on ethnic minorities and other vulnerable populations. Although the ESA Managing Director told Bellingcat that the company would deny training to applicants who support far-right ideologies and/or have links to violent ultra-nationalist organizations, several ESA training recipients from Ukraine have documented, public connections to ultra-nationalist organizations and ideologies. In some cases, these recipients of training are currently members of ultra-nationalists organizations, and others have over the years publicly shared numerous photographs of themselves giving Nazi salutes, or have highly-visible tattoos suggesting support for white supremacist movements. At least one recipient of ESA training in Poland, who is an active member of the ultra-nationalist group “Tradition and Order”, openly admitted online to supporting a “national-socialist” ideology. Another ESA training recipient with multiple certifications from the company has a highly visible white supremacist “Celtic Cross” tattoo which can be easily spotted in a photograph posted by the company to their Facebook page. Despite the fact that ESA said that they would not provide training to individuals linked to far-right ideologies and organizations, one individual who received sophisticated weapons training from ESA has swastikas tattooed on his head and was involved in a number of high-profile, internationally reported incidents of racist displays and attacks in Ukraine. The ESA Managing Director told Bellingcat that the company conducted in-depth background checks of applicants, but did not specify disqualifying criteria. »

« The group’s ability to inspire and recruit foreign fighters has contributed to Ukraine’s reputation as a bastion for the far-right.[29] The Azov Battalion specifically cites its desire for American recruits to join Azov and help counter perceived “pro-Kremlin” narratives in the U.S.[30] In interviews with far-right researchers, the Atomwaffen Division claimed to have sent members to Ukraine to obtain battlefield experience.[31] Members of the American “Rise Above Movement” (RAM) have also openly publicized meetings with members of the Azov Battalion and National Corps. Robert Rundo, leader of RAM, traveled to Kyiv and fought in mixed martial arts matches with members of the Azov Battalion in a facility owned by Azov, called the “Reconquista Club.”[32] Greg Johnson, an American white nationalist author also traveled to Kyiv to give a lecture and meet with members of the Azov.[33] A number of Russian nationals have also joined the Azov Battalion, due to their lack of political dissent options against Putin’s regime from within Russia, and the fact that Azov is a largely Russian speaking organization.[34]

In 2015, as intermittent fighting in Donbas continued, the U.S. government placed a ban on any of its material or financial aid to Ukraine going to the Azov Battalion due to its far-right association. While the ban was lifted in 2016, Congress reinstated it again as part of a Defense Appropriations bill in 2018.[35]

In 2016, Olena Semenyaka, a new spokeswoman and head of Azov’s International Outreach Office, embarked on a new set of efforts to grow the group’s international ties. She is the principal coordinator behind Azov’s vast transnational network in and around Europe. Semenyaka networked and organized events with far right organizations and ideologues from Europe and the U.S.[36] Since 2016, she has regularly traveled across Europe, meeting with far right groups, including Italy’s CasaPound, and Germany’s National Democratic Party, largely attempting to win their support instead of Putin.[37] Semenyaka also spoke at the far right Scandza Forum in Sweden, alongside Mark Collett, a Neo-Nazi activist from Britain’s National Party and self described nazi sympathizer.[38] Azov has also hosted members and communicated with members of several different American organizations. In 2020, two members of the U.S. based neo-nazi group, Atomwaffen Division, were deported by the Ukrainian government after they attempted to set up a local affiliate and join the Azov Battalion.[39] »

« The fact that right-wing extremists are cooperating internationally more than ever today is a reality recognized by most researchers and government officials. This article describes some of the mechanisms that are fueling this development. The main finding is that right-wing extremists today, in many cases, no longer subscribe to the narrow concept of nationalism but instead imagine themselves as participants in a global struggle against a global enemy. Consequently, networking and cooperating across borders is seen as a necessity. This process is further supported by shared ideological writings, technological advancement, and the conflict in Ukraine, which has served as a powerful accelarator.

In recent years, analysts and security institutions alike have pointed out that right-wing extremists are increasingly networking across borders and even continents. “Right-wing extremists maintain international links and mutual exchange and are influenced by key treatises and emblematic personalities worldwide,” Europol stated in its 2020 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.1 The Counter Extremism Project (CEP), in a study funded by Germany’s foreign office, concluded in November 2020 that “the 21st century, and the period after 2014 in particular, saw the emergence of a new leaderless, transnational and apocalyptic violent extreme right-wing (XRW) movement.”2 The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) of the United Nations Security Council declared in April 2020 that it had been “alerted by Member States to their increasing concern at the growing and increasingly transnational threat posed by extreme right-wing terrorism” and that “ten of the 31 states in which CTED conducted assessment visits … in 2018 and 2019 raised this threat as an issue of concern.”3 [...] The planned attack did not pan out, largely because they were unable to obtain weapons. But Oberhuber continued to be fascinated by violence and stumbled across the Azov Battalion on the internet. Founded in 2014 in Ukraine, shortly after the war started on the country’s eastern border, the Azov Battalion was well known for accepting foreign mercenaries wanting to join the fight against the pro-Russian separatists. Using WhatsApp, Oberhuber contacted a German neo-Nazi who he hoped could bring him to the front. The German turned out to be a functionary with Misanthropic Division, which tried to recruit fighters for the Azov Battalion in Ukrainej in a number of countries. Oberhuber was electrified. [...] But Oberhuber’s radicalization and his journey into the Ukrainian right-wing extremist orbit nonetheless offer a glimpse into the factors at work. It shows not only how comparatively easy it is to connect with relevant actors, but it also proves that until very recently (and perhaps still today, if somewhat restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic) international travel and networking, at least between Western and Eastern Europe, was (and is) possible for right-wing extremists.

One woman has played a crucial role in connecting far-right extremists in Germany with Ukraine. Activist Olena Semenyaka, a young woman from Kiev who at one point was a student of philosophy, is today associated with a political party that has its roots in the Azov movement. She has dark brown hair, a petite figure, and is frequently the only woman in pictures full of bearded, muscle-bound brutes. For Ukrainian right-wing extremists, Semenyaka essentially plays the role of ‘poster girl.’ In a leaked photo, she is shown giving the Hitler salute and posing with a swastika.23

An entire movement has developed around the Azov Battalion in recent years. The goal is to establish a global coalition of right-wing extremist groups, Semenyaka said in a 2019 interview with Time magazine.24

Semenyaka has been visiting right-wing extremist groups across Europe for years as a kind of marketing representative. According to Die Zeit’s reporting, she has visited Germany eight times—at the invitation of the German right-wing political party Die Rechte, for example, or as a speaker to a group from the Identitarian Movement.k At a festival organized by the neo-Nazi party “Der III. Weg” near Erfurt in 2018, she promoted an extreme right-wing rock festival in Ukraine called Asgardsrei. “All of you are explicitly invited to Kiev!”

Asgardsrei is one of the largest events of its kind, and it is sometimes even possible to see Atomwaffen Division flags waving in the audience.25 Semenyaka has leveraged the black-metal festival to form a kind of congress, called Pact of Steel, enabling right-wing extremists from Norway, Italy, Germany, the United States, and elsewhere to get to know each other and exchange ideas.26 It is at functions like these that the internationalization of the movement is being fostered, with the lines between politics and war, activism and militancy purposefully being blurred.

In February 2020, U.S. Congressman Max Rose and terrorism expert Ali Soufan published an op-ed in The New York Times.27 The war in Ukraine, they wrote, had become for right-wing extremists what the war in Afghanistan had been for jihadis in the 1980s and 1990s. Back then, volunteers from many countries traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the country’s secular rulers and their Soviet backers. One of them, of course, was Usama bin Ladin, who created al-Qa`ida out of a group of hardcore fanatics. That war turned out to be a kind of Big Bang for 21st century Islamist terrorism.

Is it useful to look at the conflict in Ukraine through this lens? Yes and no: Yes, because the conflict has without question helped galvanize the right-wing extremist movement, and no, because the two cases cannot be easily compared. In Ukraine, to name only the most significant difference, right-wing extremist volunteers were recruited by both parties of the conflict, with a majority of foreign fighters joining the Russian side.28 Ukraine was not a single cause célèbre that united the movement through the fight against one common enemy. Instead, it made visible different undercurrents within the larger movement. However, what can safely be said is that some of those who met either on the battlefield or in training or at one of the functions that have grown out of the original far-right extremist mobilization effort in the Ukraine war have since created networks of peers and in some cases gained crucial know-how, whether military or ideological. Felix Oberhuber says he himself knows three German neo-Nazis who have returned from the front. And other former right-wing extremists told Die Zeit of neo-Nazis who joined the Azov Battalion primarily to receive weapons training.29 »

« The situation is different with foreign fighters who gravitated to the Ukrainian side. Here, apart from the unproven allegations that the Christchurch attacker trained with or even fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian volunteer battalions, accusations concerning their intent to at least dabble in political violence concentrated not on the individual foreign fighters or their networks in the broader West but rather on the Ukraine-based units that hosted them. The main culprit here so far is the Azov Regiment. It is the subject of intense discussion amongst experts about whether, due to its alleged XRW connections, it should be designated a “foreign terrorist organisation” (FTO) by the U.S. Department of State.24

It is true that this unit, currently within the structures of the National Guard of Ukraine (the country’s gendarmerie), accepted Western individuals from extremist milieu into its ranks. However, for example, the aforementioned Swedish and other foreign fighters often arrived in Ukraine in the early stages of the conflict—before the Azov Regiment was established and subsequently became the alleged epicentre of European neo-Nazi mobilisation.25

This suggests that the foreign fighter mobilisation to Ukraine had initially not been primarily neo-Nazi or XRW in nature. Rather, some members of the XRW scene in general or neo-Nazis in particular had opted to join the war. As explained above, they had varying motivations, especially the “fatalist” push factor combined with the martial discourse deployed by either side as a pull factor.

Similarly, the French fighters for the DNR/LNR side, many with XRW convictions, deployed eastwards not because the “new republics” promised the introduction of a socio-political programme favoured by the French far right. Those fighters joined because they saw in the conflict as part of a struggle against U.S. imperialism.

Unsurprisingly, the interviewed members of the Ukrainian Azov movement (which comprises not only the regiment but also a political party, paramilitary unit, a charity, and intellectual and social wings)26 distance themselves from the image of global neo-Nazi kingpins with which they are often portrayed in international media. To some extent, they seem baffled by the attention, as they are products of the XRW scene that, as one expert put it, “was always looking to Western Europe or the United States” for influence or inspiration. 27

They have internationalist ideas that would see the CEE region evolving into a separate, i.e., neither Eastern (pro-Russia) nor Western (pro-U.S. and/or pro-EU) geopolitical entity. In their political view this new entity would not, be “consumed by petty nationalistic chauvinism responsible for seemingly endless 20th century squabbles amongst the CEE countries” (the Intermarium concept—literally between the seas: Baltic, Adriatic, and the Black Sea). The member states of this new entity would pursue nationalist domestic policies that could appeal to members of Western XRW scenes, sometimes enchanted with homogeneous (population-wise) CEE countries with very few MENA migrants and often political cultures that, in their eyes, are less prone to being hijacked by “political correctness.”

Moreover, Ukraine, which sits at the epicentre of this project, is a country at war, with a string of nationalist political but also (paramilitary) forces, like the Azov Regiment, and offers Western allies, fans, visitors, etc. a chance to bask in the frontline or activist glory of fellow nationalists. Such individuals are the “passive” war tourists, individuals keen on photo-ops but not necessarily the “real” foreign fighters in Ukraine’s conflict. Their arrival does not threaten Ukraine’s security but, through the Azov movement, could damage the country’s international standing.

At the same time, the interviewed Azov movement members, while admitting that the organization has difficulties with controlling the extreme political convictions—even by XRW standards—of some of their “guests” or wannabe “allies” do not hide their keenness to reach new audiences or to host almost anyone who is supportive of Ukraine in its struggle with Russia. This is, in their words, to “increase the volume” of Ukrainian strategic communication in general, and of Ukrainian nationalists in particular, and counter Russia’s inroads into the XRW scenes of the West.

In this process, the movement seems to be following a Churchillian logic of “an alliance with the devil” [i.e., the USSR in 1941] to reach the desired political conclusion. One interviewee recalled: “I have a mafia style rule to this. I mean, I will talk to anyone who will not assess, censure me or impose their beliefs upon me. I am open minded.” This approach is not only supposed to help sell the Intermarium but also its promised nationalist Reconquista (or the “reconquest” of Europe.

This concept, which is a central part of Western XRW narrative (see the Identitarian Movement), is summed up as the reversal of its alleged current decline, led by nationalists, by a deep and radical reconquest of the mind, history, intellect, and culture of Europe, which is to be launched from the CEE). The movement’s powerful “war story” is also deployed in the process of winning hearts and minds. However, potential allies are not encouraged, as the author was told, to effectively “join” the Azov Regiment. Joining Azov is currently a difficult task without permanent residence in Ukraine.

Given its “alliance with the devil” strategy, the degree to which Azov is able to keep its friends and allies in check, however, remains debatable. This means that even with the best intentions, the movement will have problems with its international supporters. These are individuals who, while in Ukraine, only pose for photos outside Azov headquarters or attend mixed martial arts fights organised by its members but, upon returning home, could engage in acts of criminality or political violence.

This will further fuel speculation about whether the Azov Regiment is a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) and the central hub of neo-Nazi militancy or even terrorism in the West. Therefore, one might deplore its nationalist policies and neo-Nazi members in its ranks. As Azov interviewees stated to the author, they vividly remember these “tough guys” (read: outspoken neo-Nazis) who were pushed to the fore during the war’s early days. Nevertheless, the movement does not, fully meet the definition of an FTO. It does not have the intention to conduct acts of terrorism and its training capacities are not the equivalent of those in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, for example.

One of its former foreign members commented on this very issue rather bluntly: “30-35 Westerners fought in the regiment with 5-6 Americans in total. What terrorism? What threat?” Of course, Azov remains a controversial socio-political entity that would have not come into being had it not been for the war in Ukraine. It espouses policies that oppose EuroAtlantic integration, that is favoured by Ukraine’s Western neighbours. Consequently, however, its party/paramilitary organisation/charity/business/military regiment status should be of concern primarily to the Ukrainian authorities, and not necessarily to the U.S. State Department.

As was shown, it positions itself as a point of reference or a role model to its global “friends,” including those of the RXW spectrum. However, Azov steers clear of calls to terrorist violence, and—regardless of, as the author was told, “readiness to fight in the streets” in Ukraine—the movement has avoided calls for international militant action in favour of its Intermarium or Reconquista concepts. »

« As Kuzmenko points out, Washington has long recognized the danger posed by the Azov Regiment. For example, language introduced in 2018 to the government spending bill, and maintained since, banned using U.S. funds for the provision of arms, training, or other assistance to the unit. In 2019, 40 lawmakers signed a letter asking for the Azov Regiment to be declared a foreign terrorist organization. The Azov Regiment's active far-right recruiting efforts were also brought to the attention of the Biden administration in a letter sent by Democratic Representative Elissa Slotkin to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in April. The State Department sent a brief reply to Newsweek's request for comment on whether the presence of far-right elements in or allied with Ukraine's armed forces or the travel of U.S. citizens to Ukraine to associate with such groups was a concern for the Biden administration. "The United States is committed to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity in the face of unprovoked Russian aggression," a State Department spokesman said, and referred further questions regarding Ukrainian troops to the Ukrainian government. The issue has proven a sensitive subject for other arms of the U.S. government as well. The Department of Homeland Security, whose former Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan discussed tracking the activities of U.S. citizens suspected to have ties to far-right forces in Ukraine back in 2019, did not immediately respond to Newsweek's request for comment. Both the FBI and Department of Justice declined to comment. Kuzmenko criticized what he saw as indifference of the U.S. to the status quo in Ukraine while continuing to provide military assistance, an issue seemingly compounded by a growing trend in Ukraine toward romanticizing fascism. "As far as the international arena goes, it is puzzling that the U.S. government is alarmed by the far-right Azov movement/Regiment because of its attraction for the U.S. far-right, banned the U.S. funds from being used to provide training and arms to it, yet at the same time is totally fine with the Regiment carrying on as a part of a Ukrainian government that receives billions of dollars in U.S. assistance," Kuzmenko said. "U.S. influence in Ukraine is very clear and Washington has been able to press the country on reforms it deems necessary," he added. "Apparently deradicalizing the Ukrainian military and security forces of far-right elements is simply not on Washington's wish-list. The same applies to other Western governments supporting Ukraine." Kuzmenko called on the U.S. and Western allies "to treat neo-Nazis and the far-right in Ukraine's military and elsewhere in the same fashion they treat them in other Western militaries." Shortly after coming to office in January, Biden's top Pentagon chief, Lloyd Austin, announced an unprecedented review of extremism rooted in the U.S. military, a probe partially prompted by the large number of veterans involved in the 1/6 riots and other far-right demonstrations in the country. But even at home, the U.S. government's focus on tackling far-right organizations, including white supremacist, white nationalist and neo-Nazi groups, has come under scrutiny. While they are often targeted by law enforcement for observation, membership alone does not constitute a crime under U.S. law, nor does traveling abroad to meet like-minded individuals, provided they do not belong to a recognized foreign terrorist organization. [...] Buzzfeed News first reported in October that the Department of Justice and FBI took the rare move of opening up a case against former U.S. Army soldier Craig Lang and six other U.S. citizens for their alleged roles in torturing separatists while fighting with far-right forces in Ukraine, where he traveled in 2015. The investigation comes pursuant to the U.S. War Crimes Act, under which no U.S. national has ever before been prosecuted since the law was passed a quarter of a century ago. Lang has also been charged by authorities with the killing of a Florida couple during a 2018 robbery that apparently prompted him to flee back to Ukraine. Van Zeller had made contact with Lang during the filming of the Trafficked episode in Kyiv, though the U.S. veteran ultimately declined to speak on camera after setting up a meeting near a metro station. Lang, who is also accused of helping to recruit other foreign fighters in Ukraine, is currently forbidden from leaving the Eastern European country and is facing extradition to the U.S. And just prior to van Zeller's arrival in Ukraine, two U.S. nationals allegedly affiliated with the Atomwaffen movement were expelled from the country for apparently attempting to join local military units. [...] "No good can come from American extremists fighting in Ukraine," Douglas Wise, who served in the CIA as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service and was deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told Newsweek. "The courage and sacrifices of the Ukraine people will be sullied and soiled by their presence." "Ukraine should expel them as soon as they identify and find them," he added. But beyond this, the intricacies of the U.S. legal system and First Amendment protections limit the space to which certain freedoms of association can be restricted even for fringe groups in the U.S. This issue was noted by Evelyn Farkas, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia. Further complicating the situation, she said Ukraine's severe military disadvantage proved to be an incentive for Kyiv to court far-right fighters. "They have right now existential issues to deal with, and the far-right groups are helping defend Ukraine," Farkas told Newsweek. "So at this moment in time, the Ukrainian government needs all the help it can get from its citizens, regardless of their ideology." [...] And while far-right and even neo-Nazi organizations in both the U.S. and Ukraine don't share this same blacklisted status, there are other tools available to crack down on them and the ties they have established, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act that has been used to take on organized crime in the U.S. But far-right organizations have also identified the parallels between their global appeal and the international recruiting efforts of jihadi groups like the Islamic State (ISIS). The Soufan Center has extensively examined the international machine of far-right messaging, including how it emanates from Ukraine. "White supremacy extremists and violent far-right movements can see in Ukraine a number of issues with which they can identify, including a quest for racial or religious purity, as well as a broader challenge to the progressive liberal democratic order that has dominated much of Europe in the post-Cold War era," The Soufan Center's Executive Director Naureen Chowdhury Fink told Newsweek. "Ukraine has emerged as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism, attracting foreign recruits from all over the world," she added. "It allows white supremacists to identify a conflict that amplifies their values and concerns, but also to gain the kinds of operational and tactical experience they've seen others, like violent jihadist groups, obtain in conflict zones." Despite the vast ideological differences between the white nationalist far-right and ultraconservative Islamist fundamentalism, Fink, who previously served as the senior policy adviser on counterterrorism and sanctions at the United Kingdom's mission to the United Nations, said that acolytes of the former "have often expressed admiration for the militarized experiences terrorist groups like ISIS have offered adherents, and Ukraine provides an opportunity for them to develop some of their own." "It also allows white supremacist extremists to strengthen their networks and bolster a transnational dimension to the movement so that, as we saw with violent jihadist groups, the local and regional grievances and dynamics can be linked to a global 'master narrative' able to inspire and mobilize recruits and support," she said. [...] One area of common ground established between far-right groups in the U.S. and Ukraine has been a fixation with mixed martial arts and the promotion of fight clubs that emphasize hypermasculine ideals laced with white supremacy. Followers of the California-based Rise Above Movement, which calls itself "the premier MMA club of the Alt-Right," has openly broadcast meetings with members of the Azov Regiment and the National Corps, and figures associated with the U.S. group were later spotted at the 1/6 rally-turned-attack on the Capitol alongside those of other well-known far-right forces ranging from pundits to militiamen. Perhaps even more potently, this messaging is widely disseminated online, often masked with edgy posts and tongue-in-cheek memes in forums that have established themselves as breeding grounds for far-right tendencies. Kristofer Goldsmith, CEO of the veteran-owned open-source intelligence firm Sparverius, told Newsweek that it often "starts out as what they would describe as a joke," but "when you immerse yourself or you're immersed by your community in propaganda, the funny part of the joke goes away, and the joke becomes reality." "That's why we have people who describe themselves as nationalist socialist in the United States," he said. Goldsmith, who also works with the Innovation Lab and Veterans for American Ideals projects at Human Rights First, said he has come across a number of stories of young men spending all their money to travel to Ukraine to meet up with the likes of the Azov Regiment and becoming stranded in a situation he likened to being "stuck in a real-life video game where you can't respawn." But he sees an even more subversive goal when it comes to the organized far-right in the U.S. itself. "These extremist American organizations are looking to create a cadre of trained and experienced terrorists," Goldsmith said, "a guerrilla warfare veteran, a potential leader of a guerrilla warfare unit when they get stateside." [...] At least one foreign far-right attack has been potentially linked to Ukraine. In a manifesto posted shortly before his 2019 shooting spree at a series of Christchurch mosques marked the worst mass killing in New Zealand's history, Brenton Harrison Tarrant referenced trips to Ukraine among other destinations. The 74-page document has become an icon of the global far-right, and has come full circle back to Ukraine, where Russian national Alexander Sachkov was arrested last year by authorities under suspicion of selling translated copies of Tarrant's words. Interviewed by van Zeller, Sachkov denied translating or printing the book but said he agreed with Tarrant's views on how "our countries are being replaced by newcomers." The manifesto and the anti-immigrant "Great Replacement" theory were also cited as inspirations by Patrick Wood Crusius, who targeted Hispanic people during a deadly mass shooting at an El Paso Walmart in August 2019. Given the interconnectivity of violent far-right rhetoric, Goldsmith argued that "the lone wolf theory is inherently flawed," citing the young men behind the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2017 Charleston, South Carolina church massacre as further examples. [...] Rhodesia refers to the period of white rule in what was formerly the United Kingdom colony in modern-day Zimbabwe, which was established with the 1979 victory of Black insurgents against the elite European minority in a conflict known as the Bush War. Nostalgia for the white fighting force has been cultivated today among white supremacists and white nationalists, who view other races and ethnicities as inferior and unwelcome, even in the U.S., a now-diverse country established forcefully by whites in a foreign land. "The mythology behind Rhodesia exists in the American far-right," Goldsmith said, "and this Ukrainian conflict is a gateway to using the Rhodesia experiment on American soil. That's the goal." »

« In your book, you call Azov one of the most ambitious far-right movements in the world. Why is that?

At least in the past, it has been ambitious in terms of its international goals. From 2017 to 2019, it was very active in networking with far-right movements in other countries – including Germany with for example Der III. Weg (The Third Path). But two factors really curtailed these international ambitions. Firstly, terror attacks as in Christchurch really increased international focus on the issue of far-right extremism and terrorism – bringing with it increased scrutiny, not all of it even deserved, to be frank. Because the way the Christchurch killer was linked to Azov wasn’t exactly true, even if his manifesto used similar language and symbols and Azov members spoke positively of him. But this increased international pressure. Secondly, the pandemic also affected matters from 2020. But Azov is still well-connected with far-right movements in Estonia, Croatia and Poland.

[...]

What is their goal?

To fundamentally transform not just Ukrainian, but also European politics and society. As Olena Semenyaka, former primary international representative of the movement, told me in an interview: Azov needed “to overcome this psychological resistance to nationalist, far-right ideas” in Ukrainian society and to counteract what she described as a “demonised image of the far right”. Even if this goal is just pie in the sky, they have been able to shift the needle as far to the right as possible. Their rhetoric has become increasingly acceptable. »

« Why Designating the Azov Movement as an FTO Is Ineffective

When the radical right is concerned, group designations and proscriptions aren’t always the best policy tool.

For one, I’ve seen this play out before. In 2019, another member of US Congress, Max Rose, authored a similar letter demanding that the Azov Battalion be designated as an FTO. Rose’s letter was, ultimately, a complete failure. As I wrote from Ukraine in November 2019, it contained inaccurate information, including the unproven claim that the Christchurch terrorist admitted to training with Azov, and ended up being a propaganda boon to the radical right. Slotkin’s letter, fortunately, doesn’t make those kinds of sweeping, evidence-free claims. But it’s not without its major flaws. [...] Having even a cursory understanding of what the Azov Movement actually is and how it functions would reveal just how difficult it would be in practice to designate it as an FTO, and, in fact, how difficult it is to proscribe these kinds of movements in practice. Even as the UK has moved to ban the violent neo-Nazi Atomwaffen Division, reports from Germany suggest that sympathizers are using still-existing networks to rebuild an offshoot of the group there. The question then turns to who would be designated as an FTO. Would it be the regiment alone, which is itself a member of Ukraine’s National Guard and thus a member of the country’s armed forces? As counter-extremism expert Kacper Rekawek pointed out last week in a blog post for the Counter Extremism Project, the US would surely never designate an official unit of an American ally’s military, whether one likes it or not. Moreover, and to move further into the morass, would the broader movement be proscribed as an FTO, and if so, whom would that include? One could see it encompassing the National Corps and Centuria, but does that include every single affiliated organization, from sports clubs to youth camps? What would be the legal criteria for determining whether an entity is or isn’t part of the movement? And, moreover, which individuals can even be described as being part of the movement? Trying to parse these questions would be a veritable nightmare.

Even worse, I can easily imagine how affiliated organizations within the movement would worm their way out of being part of the designation, which exposes a serious flaw with going after the radical right through the means of executive group proscription. Daryl Johnson, an American domestic terrorism expert and former senior analyst with the US Department of Homeland Security, told a journalist in Canada, my home country, that its government’s efforts to ban groups like the Proud Boys were “more of a symbolic gesture,” and that radical-right organizations facing these kinds of bans could simply just change their names and regroup under a new banner. Given that, in the Ukrainian context, radical-right organizations and affiliates have a history of changing their names and branding while maintaining the core leadership, one should expect this to continue if an attempt to proscribe the entire movement were to actually happen. If US and Ukraine’s other Western allies are seriously concerned about the Azov Movement — as they should be — there are far more effective means at their disposal than the clumsy if attention-grabbing mechanism of a foreign terrorist organization designation. [newsletter_template] They should consider, for one, designating specific individuals, with specific and justified reasons, instead of broader groups and movements. Visa and travel bans for specific prominent individuals, which would also encourage European allies to extend visa-free Schengen Area restrictions to those same individuals, would also be useful. There is also the option of placing pressure, both public and private, on Ukraine’s government and elements in the Ukrainian state to properly acknowledge and tackle the issue of the violent radical right in their country — pressure that could even include making some international funding and financial support contingent on tackling the problem. These would be much more effective starting points for the US or any other Western country worried about the activities of Ukraine’s Azov Movement than any attempted FTO designation. »

Source trouvée en cherchant "Azov Haaretz":

« Brazilian Neo-Nazis Recruited to Fight pro-Russian Rebels in Ukraine

According to Brazilian police an Italian member of an international socialist group called Misanthropic Division was recruiting youngsters to fight in Ukraine.^{[à développer]} »

Il y a eu des accusations contre le gouvernement israëlien concernant la supposée livraison d'armes à Azov, mais cela semble être faux.

Liens établis entre le régiment ou le mouvement Azov et les groupes extrémistes nationaux

Au niveau national, de nombreux groupes extrémistes, comme National Corps et Centuria, sont issus d'Azov.

« In winter 2015, veterans and volunteers of the regiment created the Azov Civil Corps and thereby started to expand their political grouping into a multi-faceted social movement. In 2016, Bilets'kyy formed the political party National Corps, drawing membership from the Azov Civil Corps and veterans of the Azov Battalion and Regiment. In January 2018, an offshoot of the Azov movement, the unarmed vigilante organization National Squads, became a Ukrainian media sensation after it held a visually impressive public torch march. Further sub-organizations and branches of the Azov movement have emerged since 2014. They include entities such as the Engineering Corps, Cossack House, Plomin (Flame) Literary Club, Orden (Order) circle, Youth Corps, Intermarium Support Group, and others. While being partly independent, the fronts and subunits of the Azov movement share basic stances on certain political issues, closely cooperate with each other, and accept Bilets'kyy as the unofficial leader of the entire coalition. As a result, Azov is now a multi-dimensional socio-political movement that is developing in a variety of directions. [...] Despite officially allying itself with Svobody and others since 2016, the Azov movement remains an ideologically and institutionally specific phenomenon within Ukraine's ultra-nationalist political spectrum and contains branches that profess views untypical to the traditional Ukrainian far right. For example, some Azov members espouse not a Christian-Orthtodox outlook, but an interest in paganism. [...] In August 2020, a number of Azov leaders and veterans as well as other activists from certain nationalist student and cadet groups presented a new paramilitary right-wing organization labeled Centuria - a Roman Empire term for a military unit of hundred men. The Ukrainian group uses the latin version and transcription of the more familiar Ukrainian word sotnia (hundred) as its official name. Against a backdrop of images of Roman legions, Centuria held its first public presentation with Ihor Mykhailenko, the former head of the Azov movement's National Squads, as its main speaker. This move signaled that the National Squads had been replaced by Centuria. Centuria's website announced that their organization represents "a group of organized youth based on the world view of Ukrainian Stateness and European tradition." Since 2020 Centuria has been involved in a variety of public activities such as participating in the annual march on October 14 in Kyiv honoring the UPA, rallies against illegal logging, court hearings on right-wing activists, and the promotion of Ukraine's medieval heritage. Thereby, the organization duplicates the activism of its predecessor, the National Squads. While not formally subordinated to the National Corps, most of Centuria's members are connected to the Azov movement.  »

Liens établis entre le régiment ou le mouvement Azov et les groupes extrémistes à l'international

Pour résumer, liens étroits à l'international documentés entre Azov et: Rise Above Movement (RAM, néonazi), Dritte Weg (Third Way, néonazi), Nordic Resistance Movement (néonazi), Misanthropic Division (néonazi), Wotanjugend (néonazi), Atomwaffen Division (néonazi), le tireur de Christchurch, plusieurs personnalités de l'extrême-droite radicale croate et américaine et d'ailleurs, groupes et personnalités néo-nazi russes.

« Conducted together with online open-source investigators Bellingcat, my research into the National Corps has revealed a pattern of troubling international activity and ties to white supremacist groups. New revelations appear regularly. I recently learned that the National Corps apparently provided training in Odesa to a member of American neo-Nazi group “Rise Above Movement”. In 2019, the party invited German neo-Nazi party “Dritte Weg” (Third Way) to march alongside Ukrainian veterans in Kyiv. In an earlier interview with the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement, the party’s international secretary promised opportunities to train “in military tactics, shooting and more” in Ukraine. On the international stage, the party touts its ties to the Regiment in order to boost its legitimacy. »

« Among Azov’s closest American allies has been the Rise Above Movement, or RAM, a far-right gang, some of whose members have been charged by the FBI with a series of violent attacks in California. The group’s leader, Robert Rundo, has said his idea for RAM came from Ukraine’s far-right scene. “This is always my whole inspiration for everything,” he told a right-wing podcast in September 2017, referring to Azov as “the future.” “They really have the culture out there,” he said. “They have their own clubs. They have their own bars. They have their own dress style.” [...] On Aug. 11, 2017, Facebook’s problem with the radical right became much harder to ignore. A procession of neo-Nazis and white supremacists marched that day through the city of Charlottesville, Va., carrying torches and Confederate flags in a rally called Unite the Right. The next day, one of them struck and killed a counterprotester with a car. The rally was organized, in part, on Facebook. (Among its more violent participants, according to the FBI, were three members of RAM, the gang whose leader would later describe Azov as an inspiration.) For many, the violence in Charlottesville was a watershed moment, a brazen display of how white supremacy had entered the political mainstream in the U.S. with implicit support from President Donald Trump. »

« In Ukraine, the Azov Battalion has recruited foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, including many from the West, to join its ranks and receive training, indoctrination, and instruction in irregular warfare. In late September, a U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Riley in Kansas was arrested after distributing information online about how to build a bomb and planning to travel to Ukraine to fight with the Azov Battalion. Members of the “western outreach office” travel around Europe to promote the organization and meet with like-minded individuals and groups. In addition, the group invited prominent white supremacy extremist ideologues to visit Ukraine.141 In October 2018 American Greg Johnson, a leading ideologist for the white nationalist movement, visited Ukraine and attended a series of events hosted by the National Corps In the summer of 2018, German-language flyers were distributed among audience members at a rock concert in Thuringia, inviting them to be part of the Azov Battalion: “join the ranks of the best” in order to “save Europe from extinction.”142 Similar efforts to infiltrate mainstream German society by softpedaling messages of racism and hatred are staged frequently. [...] The Azov Battalion has cultivated a relationship with members of the Atomwaffen Division as well as with U.S.-based militants from R.A.M., the Southern California–based organization that the FBI has labeled a “white supremacy extremist group.” The relationships between U.S.- based WSEs and the Azov Battalion go beyond mere networking and include training and radicalization of American extremists. The Azov Battalion also maintains a political wing and has ties to a growing vigilante street movement that can be counted on for violence, intimidation, and coercion. So far, nationals from Germany, the UK, Brazil, Sweden, the United States, and Australia have reportedly traveled to join the Azov Battalion in Ukraine. The group has also allegedly established youth camps, recreation centers, lecture halls, and indoctrination programs, including some that teach children as young as 9 years old military tactics and white supremacist ideology. »

« In April 2018, members of RAM then traveled to Kiev, Ukraine, to visit and train with the Azov Battalion, originally a paramilitary force that fought against Russian irregular forces working with separatists in Eastern Ukraine. [...] American white supremacists have gained even greater exposure to the ideas of racial extremists from Southeast Europe through their involvement with Azov, as it has attracted white supremacist foreign fighters[34] from many countries including Greece and Croatia, with some 20 Croats joining the battalion in 2015.[35] Also, Azov moved to form a “foreign legion” of sorts under the leadership of a Croat living in Zagreb. According to BIRN, Bruno Zorica, a retired Croatian army officer and former member of the French Foreign Legion, was repeatedly mentioned in Azov social media posts as a key figure in the unit’s creation. Zorica commanded a special forces unit of the Croatian army during the country’s war against Belgrade-backed Serb rebels in the early 1990s.[36] According to a 2019 report by The Soufan Center, approximately 35 American fighters have traveled to Ukraine in recent years with far-right extremists attracted mostly to the anti-Russian side.[37] This mixing of white supremacists from around the world in Ukraine is now seen as a terrorism threat. “I believe Europe is in great danger,” Alberto Testa, an expert on far-right radicalization at the University of West London told Vice News in 2019. Testa believes eastern Ukraine has become a critical staging ground for the international “white jihad struggle” of the far right, where extremists could “train for what some would call racial holy war.”[38] Azov successfully recruited well-known American white supremacists to train with the unit. Joachim Furholm, a Norwegian citizen and self-described “national socialist revolutionary,” led Azov’s effort to bring Americans to Ukraine. Azov framed participation in Ukraine’s war against Russian aggression as an opportunity for Americans to acquire combat and other training for use in the United States after returning home.[39] In 2018, members of the American, neo-Nazi group, Rise Above Movement (RAM), traveled to Ukraine to visit Azov as part of a tour that started in Southeast Europe. Robert Rundo, head of RAM, was depicted in a now deleted Facebook video in a cage match with an Azov fighter.[40] Azov’s hierarchy was thrilled to have the American neo-Nazis on hand. “We think globally,” Olena Semenyaka, an Azov official, told Radio Free Europe in 2018.[41] She hosted Rundo along with RAM members Michael Miselis and Benjamin Daley, who participated in the white riots that occurred in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017 and ended in the murder of antiracist counter protester. In the case of Rundo, Miselis, and Daley, Semenyaka said, “they came to learn our ways” and “showed interest in learning how to create youth forces in the ways Azov has.”[42] Semenyaka has spoken of other important Azov allies in Southeast Europe, in particular Greece’s Golden Dawn.[43] Other American extremists have been in contact with Azov. In October 2018, American white nationalist Greg Johnson, who runs the San Francisco, Calif., based Counter-Currents Publishing, visited Ukraine and attended a series of events hosted by Azov.[44] According to Bellingcat, the late Andrew Oneschuk, a prominent member of the now defunct but very violent American neo-Nazi organization Atomwaffen Division (AWD), was in contact with Azov on its podcast.[45] Also, an alleged U.S. Navy veteran, “Shawn Irwood,” enlisted in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and maintained contact with Azov’s National Corps.[46] »

Anton Shekhovtsov, un spécialiste ukrainien de l'extrême-droite radicale en Europe, conteste plusieurs de ces liens et critique notamment le travail du Soufan Center et de Bellingcat.

Évolution d'Azov et intérêt de la guerre

« Azov was built on the inebriating rush of war; it needs war, whether metaphorical, rhetorical or literal, in order to survive. There's no guarantee that the Azov movement as we know it today will stay a unified mouvement in the future. »

« However, in the worst-case scenario Azov will get even more opportunities to present themselves as the “true defenders of the homeland and the avant-garde of the revolution.” If it comes to capturing Ukrainian cities, I’m afraid we will see far-right guerilla fighters in the streets."

"So is Azov the one group in Ukraine which is the most interested in another war?

Yes, I talk about this in my book. Azov was founded on war, so it needs a war, whether a real or a metaphorical one. As I say in my book, war gives the far-right a raison d’etre and a goal. If they get another war in 2022, whatever they say, they will be happy about it. »

« You have observed Azov for several years. How has the movement been developing and what state is it in today?

I discuss this in the last part of my book. I think that Azov is constantly changing: Azov members themselves don’t have a clear idea which direction they should move in. There is a conflict between the leaders, Biletsky and the veterans of the far-right scene on the one hand and young activists on the other. Biletsky and the old guard try to present Azov on TV as a non-threatening mainstream force. But the younger activists don’t want to be moderate. This was the line along which the OUN split in 1940: the older, more conservative members supported Andriy Melnyk, while the younger and more radical ones supported Stepan Bandera. I don’t think there will be a schism in Azov, but these contradictions will only intensify over time.

In addition, within Azov, there is a power struggle between Botsman and Biletsky. Botsman is clearly trying to build his own far-right base within Azov from people who are loyal to him personally. Well, they are the radical right, there will always be rivalry for power among them.

Another problem is Azov’s source of funding. There is information that Azov members are involved in crime and take money from Ukrainian oligarchs. Although I give a caveat in the book that these claims are impossible to verify. Some of the far-right might consider such sources of funding to be ideologically wrong.

So, in a sense, you could say that Azov is not as strong in 2021 as a year or two ago. »

« The Azov movement, particularly after 2019, has consolidated its already-dominant position on Ukraine's far-right. While there are several smaller far-right groups and relatively prominent individuals outside of Azov's orbit, ... »

« For Ukraine's Far Right, War With Russia Can Be an Opportunity

While not actively wanting a Russian invasion, Ukraine's Azov ultranationalist movement will see it as a chance to build its brand, warns far-right expert Michael Colborne^{[à développer]} »

« Azov owes its very existence to war. Without it, there would be no Azov. That’s the reason I titled my book From the Fires of War – a line from “March of Ukrainian Nationalists”, written in 1929, which was adopted as the anthem of the far-right Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. An altered version was adopted as the Ukrainian army’s official march in 2018. But I think there are also many people within Azov who do not necessarily strive for a real war. I don’t think most of them are that cynical. But, if it does come to war, they would welcome it. They see war as an opportunity on a number of levels.

[...] it’s clear that the Azov movement isn’t just going to go away. It’s too strong to be just taken out. »

Bellingcat, avec le projet Anti-Equality Monitoring où a travaillé Colborne, a fait énormément pour révéler le réseautage international d'Azov avec des groupes et personnalités néonazis à travers le monde: « Azov demeure par ailleurs toujours perçu comme un eldorado par certains suprémacistes blancs occidentaux. D’après une enquête de Bellingcat, des partisans des organisations néonazies américaines Atomwaffen Division ou encore Rise Above Movement (RAM) cherchent à intégrer les rangs d’Azov pour se former au combat en vue d’une prochaine guerre raciale. Plusieurs figures radicales d’extrême droite de l’Occident ont ainsi défilé dans un podcast Azov FM, inactif depuis cinq ans. Bellingcat révèle aussi que Joachim Furholm, un «révolutionnaire national-socialiste» norvégien soupçonné d’avoir essayé d’enrôler des volontaires suprémacistes blancs américains pour les rangs du régiment Azov, était lié au parti politique Corps national, comme en atteste sa présence lors d’un rassemblement politique. Le régiment Azov et Corps national ont respectivement nié cette allégation. »

« One of the primary ways Azov has managed to exploit Ukraine's wartime media environment is by what seems like an exercise in repeating a word over and over again: veteran. Some of the most admired and trusted people in contemporary ...^{[à développer]} »

Financements d'Azov

« Groups affiliated with the Azov mouvement, including Youth Corps, received approximately $30,000 in Ukrainian government funds in 2019 for NPE projects. »

Couverture médiatique et déclarations de ces entités

Voir ce que j'ai déjà écrit sur les enquêtes sur la couverture médiatique des mouvements de l'extrême-droite en Ukraine ici: [3], et dans les notes complètes liées plus haut, la plupart des spécialistes évoquent un avis similaire, comme ici Colborne:

« Silence won’t make the Ukrainian far right go away. Acting like any mention of the problem feeds Kremlin propaganda is only making it worse. »

« Q: The fact that Azov is a far-right movement doesn’t pose a problem for them?

A: They take part in Azov trainings not because they’re happy to hang out with a far-right group, but because they either don’t know or, in light of the situation, don’t care. Perhaps they believe the soft media coverage of Azov in Ukraine and don’t think they’re far-right at all.

[...]

Q: Azov has made efforts to “rebrand” itself. In 2015, they updated the logo of the Regiment, removing the “black sun” and tilting the Wolfsangel 45 degrees, as if to make them appear less neo-Nazi…

A: Their party National Corps is another example. Even in a coalition with other far-right parties, it can’t reach the three percent threshold in elections. But electoral politics isn’t the aim of the movement. The party is essentially the public brand of Azov. If you listen to the party’s language, it avoids extreme rhetoric, using codes instead. Andriy Biletsky, former commander of the Azov Regiment and now leader of National Corps, wouldn’t say the kinds of openly antisemitic things or use the same neo-Nazi rhetoric today as back in the 2000s. They’ve becomee more careful.

Q: This strategy has partly worked. In the past weeks, a number of international media outlets have reported on Azov or interviewed its members without mentioning that it is a far-right movement.

A: On Social Media, the “Azov Granny” made the rounds: a 79-year-old woman in Mariupol who was being trained by an Azov soldier. Many Western media outlets reported without the additional context that the training was set up by the Azov Regiment. It was a photo-op for them. At the moment, a lot of international journalists are descending on Ukraine and of course there are also reporters who don’t necessarily know what the groups and their symbols are. And that’s when it comes to embarrassing gaffes.

Q: At the same time, Russia often plays up the role of the far right in Ukraine – from the Maidan protests to the subsequent war against pro-Russian separatists. Russian media for example called the 2014 revolution a “fascist coup”.

A: What’s interesting now is the rhetoric coming from Russia compared with 2013 to 2014. You’re not seeing Russian state media or Kremlin propaganda explicitly talking about the far right in Ukraine in the same way. It doesn’t seem to be as central to their media narrative. Back then, they talked about specific far-right groups and individuals as threats, using the word “fascist” all the time, which evokes something very specific in Russian historical memory. Now, they use almost comical exaggerations of a “neo-Nazi government” in Kyiv or “genocide” in Donbas – ridiculous accusations that don’t hold any water. At the same time, Western media often downplayed the role of the far right. »

Concernant les déclarations des membres des régiments et de l'extrême-droite ukrainiens et d'ailleurs, voici ce qu'écrivent Colborne et Umland:

« What are the difficulties you faced while preparing the book? The last time we talked, you mentioned that it was impossible to talk to Nazis because they always lie. This applies to all radical right in any country. I found that there’s no point in interviewing them, because they tell lies to your face in order to present their movement or idea in a good light. Of course, it doesn’t mean you shouldn’t talk to them at all. When I write about someone in particular, I must ask for a comment. In this case, talking to them can be useful, they can deny or confirm a certain fact, but you will not get serious insights from them. Although when I went to the National Corps with questions about Andriy Biletsky for my book, they never answered me. If the far-right want to be judged fairly, they should not ignore journalist requests. I think that in the case of the far-right we first need to explore all the open sources, analyze the propaganda and communication channels, talk to other experts, and only then, at the very end, talk to them directly. »

« Azov’s initial emblem was similar to the former symbol of the Social-National Party of Ukraine and the official logo of the SNA/PU, made up of the Latin letters “I” and “N” arranged on top of one another, symbolizing the phrase “Idea of the Nation.” The emblem is also a mirror image of the so-called “wolf hook” (Wolfsangel in German), which was used by, amongst others, the SS division “Das Reich” and the Dutch SS division “Landstorm Nederland” during the Second World War, as well as a range of neo-fascist organizations after 1945.89 The symbol is illustrated below: In response to criticism about the symbol, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs alleged that the National Guard’s Azov logo is also the Nobel Foundation’s emblem. »

« By 2022, this situation has changed somewhat: there has been renewed international and particularly American media attention on the Azov movement, especially a focus on the movement's alleged role in facilitating international far-right ... »

Azov a essayé d'utiliser la crise du COVID-19 pour redorer son image, mais l'initative a coupé court au bout de seulement quelques .

Est-ce que toute l'Ukraine est nazie/d'extrême-droite?

Non, les IAGs peuvent devenir un problème dans le futur mais sont pour le moment sous contrôle du gouvernement qui garde le monopole de la violence pour le moment. L'Ukraine néanmoins est une société qui se militarise, et l'extrême-droite ukrainienne reste un réel problème, mais ce n'est pas toute l'armée ni toute la société, même si la guerre radicalise les pensées.

« Gartenstein-Ross said there’s a huge difference between a regiment with a checkered history playing a minor part on the battlefield and the notion that Ukraine is somehow overrun by neo-Nazis, as Putin has long pretended. »

Et ce n'est pas ce qui importe pour beaucoup d'ukrainiens:

« For many in Ukraine, it doesn't matter what Azov believes, whether they're far-right, neo-Nazis, fascists or otherwise -- what matters to them is that they fought against Russian aggression and are on their side (Umland, ...) »

« Q: The fact that Azov is a far-right movement doesn’t pose a problem for them?

A: They take part in Azov trainings not because they’re happy to hang out with a far-right group, but because they either don’t know or, in light of the situation, don’t care. Perhaps they believe the soft media coverage of Azov in Ukraine and don’t think they’re far-right at all.

[...]

Q: How influential was and is the far right in the Ukraine in reality?

A: The far right was always a small minority within these protests. But these were young men, mostly from the far-right hooligan subculture or wannabe far-right paramilitary types, who had experience with violence, with fighting police. They were key in pushing back the most violent impulses of the Yanukovich regime. The sad reality is that mainstream society and the far right needed each other on Maidan. However much a minority, the far right was necessary to keep the protests from being crushed by police. And without mainstream society behind them, the far right would have been defeated or even killed. »

Suggestions d'autres articles

Au vu du matériel de haute qualité disponible centré sur ces sujets, je suggère un article dédié sur le mouvement Azov, l'extrême-droite globale contemporaine (avec ses racines idéologiques historiques), les "Irregular Army Forces" (IAGs).